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By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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# HEREDITY AND PREDESTINATION*

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AT the outset I would apologise for the ponderous title of this lecture. In self-excuse I can urge that I suggested as an alternative possibility 'God and the Gene.' But, when Bishops speak in monosyllables, their ideas may excite alarm. Words of four or five syllables are impressive and comfortable. So I am discussing 'heredity and predestination.'

Unfortunately I must begin this discussion by confessing that I have no satisfying conclusions to put before you. In fact, I propose, as it were, to think aloud: to set forth my own perplexities and to invite your sympathetic consideration of them. The problem to which I ask your attention is new and the theologians have not yet got to work upon it. But I have no doubt that, as soon as the results of recent genetic research enter into the stock of the common knowledge of educated men and women, the new aspect of the relation of God to the evil in the cosmic process will be vigorously discussed.

First, I will clear the ground by indicating the way in which I conceive of God. Then I will ask you to excuse me if, for the benefit of those who are not acquainted with the results of present genetic investigation, and especially with the work of T. H. Morgan and his pupils, I briefly describe the theory of the gene. The problem to which I shall finally direct your attention arises from the conjunction of the two realms of enquiry.

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The right starting-point for theology, as Inge has said, is to examine the conception of the world as known to science. Now the concordant results of a group of sciences go to show that some millions of millions of years ago a rotating, and probably spiral, nebula, in which we have a modest place, came into being. Our sun is but one of many thousands of millions of stars belonging to this nebula. Some few thousands of millions of years ago the planets of our solar system were torn out of the sun, apparently in a cataclysm produced by the near approach of another sun. The earth gradually cooled, and in an atmosphere probably composed of water-vapour and carbon-dioxide, together possibly with a little free nitrogen and oxygen, primitive organisms appeared. As they became more complex and divergent, what we know as the vegetable and animal kingdoms came into being. Vertebrate fishes apparently arose in the Silurian Era some 350 million years ago. From them came, through the amphibians, the reptiles; and from the reptiles the mammals emerged. The apes are a highly-developed branch of the mammals, and from an ape-like stock man evolved. Submen were almost certainly in existence half-a-million years ago. If human civilization dates from the time when man first made a fire, it is possibly some 50,000 years old. But the art of writing, on which our present civilization rests, has probably not been known for more than 8,000 years.

The development which has thus led to civilized man 'reveals the unity of creation and a progressive order.' I personally accept the view that the progressive order gives evidence of an age-long purpose: earth has been continuously for the last thousand million years a realm in which a creative process has been in operation. This process has led to the emergence of new qualities of being, such as life and mind and ethical self-consciousness. The process must be the result, as I hold, of the activity of intelligent Will: and the nature of that Will must be sought in the highest products of its activity known to us. In other words, God lies behind the creative process by which we have been produced; and in the moral and spiritual loyalties and aims of the best of mankind we get an adumbration of God's nature. Thus, as it seems to me, the reasonable philosophico-religious interpretation of the Universe to be derived

from the modern scientific picture of the development of the world is Ethical Theism. I personally am thus led to accept that belief in God which the Church derives from the teaching of Christ.

During the last two generations the fact of biological evolution has slowly gained acceptance from educated men and women. There is at length general agreement that in his origin man is 'an old world monkey, most closely allied to the tailless apes.' But how comes it that in mental power he should differ so widely from his simian cousins? And, more generally, by what process have widely divergent forms of life been derived from common ancestors? In other words, what is the machinery of evolution?

Let us now use the term 'characteristic' to denote any physical or chemical feature or any aspect of mental or moral character which serves to distinguish the individual. Then obviously if offspring were invariably to resemble parents, or if their characteristics were to some extent a mean between those of the parents, species would be constant. We should never, were there such resemblance, get outside the group which constitutes the species. Thus if biological evolution be a fact, there must, as between parents and offspring, be the possibility of the appearance of new characteristics: and it must be by integrating a whole series of such new characteristics that new species are produced. The clue to evolution must then lie in the relation between the characteristics of an individual and those of its parents. This clue is, in fact, given by the modern science of genetics.

At the basis of that science lies Mendel's discovery. Suppose that in the two parents there are two opposed or alternate characteristics, such as brown and blue eyes. Will inheritance from them be by fusion, so that the children have in their germinal constitution what we may call 'a brownish-blue eye factor,' or will there be an inheritance from each parent of one or other of the alternate factors which give rise to the two characteristics? Now, according to R. A. Fisher, it can be proved that, even though new inheritable factors were to arise fairly frequently, inheritance by the fusion of parental characteristics would lead to and maintain substantial uniformity within a species. Furthermore, inheritable variations arise, as a matter

of fact, comparatively rarely. Mendel, however, discovered that, when they have arisen, they are transmitted by a non-blending process. Thus a factor for blue eyes or a factor for brown eyes can be inherited from each parent, but there will not be in the child a factor representing a fusion of the two.

The experimental work initiated by Mendel goes to show that each bi-sexual animal, such as man, has pairs of germinal factors or genes, one of which is inherited from each of his parents. The elements in each pair correspond to one another and may be either identical in their properties or not. When a new individual comes into existence half the genes of each parent are discarded and the other half go to form the characteristics which the new individual inherits. It must not be thought that there is a unique relationship between a gene and a characteristic. It is the interaction between the gene and the rest of the organism which produces the characteristics of the individual: and any particular characteristic may be the result of the co-operative action of a large number of genes.

Now each bi-sexual individual normally develops from a fertilized egg; that is to say, from a union of male and female cells. It is, moreover, by a repeated process of cellular division that the individual is formed: we are bundles of cells. In the nucleus of the cell there are microscopic filaments which may be likened to pieces of string with knots strung along them. These 'pieces of string' are called chromosomes; and there is little doubt that the knots act as the inheritance factors which we have called genes. In the nucleus of the cell the chromosomes are paired, and one of each pair of parental chromosomes is discarded at fertilization. What a gene is we do not know: it may be merely a large chemical molecule. If I said that it was probably such a molecule and something more, I should be called a vitalist—which, in biological circles, is a serious term of abuse. Let us confess ignorance and escape condemnation.

All that I have been saying as to the genes leads up to the fact that changes in them are apparently the raw material of evolution. Suddenly, and for no reason, apparently—we may, if we like, speak sagely of the inherent instability of living matter—suddenly a gene with unexpected properties appears in an individual. This mutant gene seems to have come out of

ne *Ewigkeit*. It has not been derived from either parent: but it represents a modification of a gene so derived; and the modification is specially important as the new gene may be inherited by subsequent generations. The influence of the modified gene on the characteristics of the individual in which it exists may be masked by the influence of the gene with which it paired. In that case the mutation is termed recessive. But, on the other hand, its influence may be clearly visible, and we then have a dominant mutation. In the latter case the mutant gene will probably influence a whole group of characteristics of the individual, though a single altered characteristic may be especially noticeable. Most mutations appear to be recessive: hence their consequences are not apparent unless two mutant genes get together to form a pair. But in the latter case we can usually observe in the individual a marked departure from the normal. Now the normal is the result of a prolonged process of adaptation to environment. The abnormal is therefore likely to be ill-suited to its surroundings. In fact, the individual in which both genes of a pair are mutants is only too possibly a freak and often dies at or before birth. It remains to be said that the same mutation can occur again and again. It also seems probable, though this is disputed, that a mutation can be reversed.

Probably all mutations, when they first arose, produced some change in the organism: their dominance, it is suggested, has been reduced in the course of generations as gradually the other genes of the organism have mutated so as to bring its characteristics to the normal. In this way we can understand how an organism is able to survive in the struggle for existence though it carries a recessive mutation.

Obviously when an organism is perfectly adjusted to its environment all mutations in its genes which produce changed characteristics are harmful because they impair the adjustment. But, when surrounding conditions change, those mutations which the better adapt the organism to the changed conditions will be an advantage. Now, as the hymn says, 'Change and decay in all around I see': most organisms live amid a slow though continuous change of environment. In a changing world mutations which happen to be adapted to the changed environment get their chance. They are preserved to modify the

species; and, when the process of modification has been sufficiently prolonged, a new species is produced. Thus it would seem that mutations in the genes are the raw material of evolution. Their origin, as we have said, is unknown; through them, however, the creative process works. But that process must, if ethical theism be accepted, be due to the activity of God. Yet — and here is the difficulty which is the crux of this lecture — mutations seem to be devoid of any ethical character whatever. Not only so, but, whether their effects are good or ill, they appear to re-establish predestination of Calvinistic rigidity. Tennyson's words, 'Man is man and master of his fate,' must be altered to 'The genes are genes and masters of man's fate.'

To make clear alike the extent to which the results of mutations can be good or evil, and also their power over the organism in which they appear, I will take a few examples of the effect of genetic mutations. The examples relate to inheritable abnormalities of different degrees of seriousness.

Many a man, for no apparent reason, goes bald in early middle life and, in spite of the cynics, few women share the same fate. Baldness is, in fact, according to Dorothy Osborne, a sex-limited trait, inherited as a dominant from father to son. In a woman it is normally recessive. But a woman may, by unwise choice of parents and bad luck in the discarding of the parental chromosomes, get 'the baldness gene' in both the particular chromosomes where it can exist. It will then be too strong to be inhibited by her sex, and so — a wig becomes inevitable.

I will not speak of obesity in humanity, though the genes are undoubtedly more to blame than appetite. But—and here I quote from Gates' valuable *Heredity in Man*—in mice the gene which produces yellow coat colour also causes a pronounced form of adiposity which is more marked in the females. If two of these genes pair in an individual mouse, in other words if it inherits one of them from each parent, it perishes.

Of course, mental and moral qualities do not differ from physical as regards the manner of their inheritance or the possibility of their change through mutations. The inheritance of mathematical and musical ability is a commonplace. There is some evidence that such a grave moral weakness as a craving

for alcohol is inherited. Most certainly types of insanity which only appear late in life are inherited; they must be due to some mutation in a gene or in a group of genes. Huntingdon's chorea is a horrible example of the sort of predestination which can be associated with a dysgenic mutation. It is inherited as a dominant. No sign of weakness may show itself until tremors of head, limbs and trunk appear in middle or late life. There follows progressive mental deterioration, often ending in suicide. Thus the gene may be latent for forty years in a man who combines a high character with a healthy mode of life: then apparently it begins its work of destruction.

Perhaps the most socially dangerous type of mutation which has arisen in humanity is that which produces feeble-mindedness. We are still ignorant of the germinal factors which correspond to this condition or group of conditions, and careful research is urgently needed. But the various types of feeble-mindedness are probably due primarily to a mutation in one particular gene, coupled possibly with varying mutant changes in other co-operative genes. Feeble-mindedness often behaves as a recessive, and apparently only shows itself in all its disastrous weakness when a pair of defective genes get together in the individual. But even when one such gene is, as it were, latent, the mental and moral vigour of the individual is almost certainly harmed. The Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee of last year (1929) said that, if we could segregate as a social group all the families in England to which children are born with an inherent incapacity for mental development, most of the families so collected would belong, in the words of the Report, to 'the lowest ten per cent. in the social scale.' They would include a much larger proportion of insane persons, epileptics, paupers, criminals, unemployables, prostitutes and inebriates than would a group of families not containing mental defectives. That the known facts with regard to the prevalence of mental defect are gravely disturbing there is no question. The Royal Commission of 1904-8 estimated that the feeble-minded in England and Wales were 4·6 per thousand of the population. The Report just mentioned raises the figure to 8·56. There is, I think, no good ground for the opinion that slum conditions produce genetic mutations leading to mental defect. We might expect

unfavourable conditions to produce degradation of the genes: yet evidence by analogy is lacking. It is true that, by treating mice with radium, abnormalities can be produced which lead to abnormalities in the next generation: but the mode of inheritance shows a general rather than a specific effect. According to Morgan, there is probably an upsetting of the general machinery of development and not the mutation of a gene.

Why then is the gene, or group of genes, producing feeble mindedness now so widespread in the population? The answer, beyond all doubt, is that our humane instincts, fortified by Christian teaching, have caused us to modify the harsh social conditions under which, even a couple of generations ago, many of the mentally defective would have been eliminated as soon as a new mental defect mutation appeared. In nature, among animals and insects, deleterious mutations are constantly arising; but they are suppressed by the steady and ruthless power of a hostile environment. I repeat that, so far as we can discover, mutations are as often harmful as favourable. Changes good and bad, as judged by human standards, are equally likely to arise. The changing genes offer material alike for progress and for degeneration. But what is fit to survive does survive; what is unfit perishes. The loathsome parasite survives because it is fit as regards its environment. We have by our social organization made an environment by which and in which at all events the higher grades of mental defectives are able to survive.

Now while all these disquieting facts seem to be beyond doubt, the argument for ethical theism with which I began this paper remains valid. A distinguished expert like R. A. Fisher has no theological axe to grind when he says, 'evolutionary changes are generally recognized as producing progressively higher organization in the organic world.' The progress to higher organization we have interpreted as showing purpose in the Universe: it is due, we have argued, to a God Who had in mind the creation of beings like ourselves with spiritual understanding and moral loyalties. But when we seek to discover the machinery for producing this higher organization, which has led to man with his moral self-consciousness and his spiritual faculties, we have to allow that there is no evidence that mutations dominate the trend of evolution. Mutations merely appear—

and natural selection, the power of the environment, does the rest.

Thus, as I see the matter, good and evil arise with equal frequency in the variations associated with heredity: but the divinely-guided creative process of which we are products is active through the environment. The Universe, in fact, is such that good and evil are alike present in the apparently fortuitous changes which are the raw material of evolution: and God, it would appear, acts through the environment as He uses these non-moral changes to accomplish His purpose.

To get a fair picture of the whole scheme is almost impossible. But, whatever be our instinctive bias, there is little doubt that upon the individual predestination lies heavy. A new harmful mutation or the chance combination of harmful mutations recessive in his parents, and he is handicapped so severely that in his failings and defects he will deserve all our sympathy. On the other hand, let there be a favourable mutation, or the chance combination of favourable mutations recessive in the parents, and mental or moral genius may result. May I however say that, though such be the facts of inheritance, I see no reason to conclude that in life we have no freedom of choice. Strict determinism we need by no means accept. Destiny, it would appear, rough hews our ends but we may shape them as we will. And doubtless in the Divine scheme of things we shall be judged, not by absolute standards, but according to our genes. Not what we are, but how far we have attained to what we have it in our power to do or to be, will determine the verdict.

None the less we have to remember that the man who carries defective genes is often *ipso facto* unfitted to the social environment in which he finds himself and which it is our duty to improve. His germinal constitution will make him an impediment to social progress; and we have to consider, in the light of such knowledge, both his existence and his power to beget children. Now we can only begin to understand the presence of so much evil in this world, which we believe to be ruled by a God of goodness and truth, if we regard that evil as the spur by which from a lowly origin man has reached his present development. Though I have no belief in the inheritance of acquired characters, I think we must allow that it is by struggling against

evil and adverse circumstances that man's moral and spiritual faculties have been sharpened; and the individual who emerges most successfully from such a struggle is best fitted to lead the race a little nearer to that perfect ideal of social organization which the Christian terms the Kingdom of God. All these considerations make it clear that the individual, in whose germ plasm dysgenic mutations exist which make him a hindrance to the civilized progress of humanity, ought not to hand on his defect to posterity. It is our duty to overcome evil, and that duty is as definite when the evil exists in a harmful mutation in some other man as when it exists in ourselves. Thus, in the stage of civilized progress which we have now reached, it is, in particular, our duty as a race to eliminate mental defect. Against the individual in whom such defect appears we must not show hardness. He deserves all our pity. But pity need not be absent because we regard measures to improve the quality of the race as a service to God.

What practical steps can we take as regards mental defect, it may be asked. Already we segregate idiots and imbeciles. Are morons with a mental capacity of from 8 to 12 years of age also to be segregated or sterilized? Will you attempt to treat in the same way the ten per cent. of the population in which you suspect that mental defect is recessive? Merely to put these questions shows the urgency of the need for more accurate knowledge. Until the various types of defect are classified, and their modes of inheritance known, successful legislation is impossible. But such enquiries are by no means to be regarded as hopelessly difficult. I venture, for instance, to suggest that it is quite probable that slight physical peculiarities accompany various types of mental defect, for a single gene influences many parts of the body. It is even possible that latent defect is associated with slight, though recognizable, physical signs. If these speculative suggestions are well founded the door to accurate knowledge is open. As I see the matter, we are only at the beginning of researches of almost infinite extent and of vast importance. There is, alas! no dearth of material for investigation: something like 300,000 mental deficients are known to exist to-day in England and Wales.

But, in thus pleading for an extension of scientific research, I have passed from the theological problems which our new knowledge of genetics forces us to consider. St. Paul imagined that evil and death resulted from Adam's fall. We have learned, on the contrary, that evil and good are equally likely to arise at every stage of the evolutionary process. Hundreds of millions of years before man appeared on the earth mutations, both good and bad, were arising. The notion that evil is due to a fall, to some act of spiritual rebellion against God, must be abandoned. We need not grieve over the loss of such a theory as it cannot really relieve God of ultimate responsibility for His creation. But we take a further and surprising step when we allow that, in the genetic mutations which are the raw material of evolution, we can discover no moral quality. In these fundamental changes, apparently so directly the result of creative activity, God does not reveal Himself. Yet, none the less, natural selection as Darwin envisaged it—and apparently there is no need of other machinery — natural selection or, in other words, the pruning knife of the environment, has led to a progress culminating in ourselves. Thus, if you accept the view that the progress which has led to man is evidence of Divine purpose directed to spiritual ends, the action of God is through the environment and is more elusive than we previously suspected. This conclusion ought not, perhaps, to surprise us. Whenever we think to discover God at work, further knowledge reveals a mechanism behind which He remains hidden. Thus some would have us believe that all is mechanism and that God is merely an anthropomorphic invention of our own. But not from mechanism has the poet's sense of beauty been derived. I range myself with the thinkers who cannot fit righteousness and truth into a mechanical universe. Furthermore, I am convinced that, unless the whole scheme of things is meaningless or irrational, human personality at its best must have eternal significance and value. But then perplexity raises its head. These dwarfed or maimed personalities that result from dysgenic mutations and are, as it were, the obverse of mental or moral genius, how shall we assess their value? I must leave the question unanswered.

# KARL BARTH—PROPHET OR HERETIC?

By the Rev. E. C. Dewick, M.A., author of
*Primitive Christian Eschatology.*

AN Anglican dignitary was asked recently what he thought of the theology of Karl Barth. 'Karl Barth?' he replied with obvious perplexity, 'Karl Barth?' But was he not a Socialist and an Atheist?' The reply is typical of the dignified insularity of the English Church, where the name of Karl Barth —best-known, perhaps, of all living Continental theologians— is so unfamiliar that it suggests only vague and uneasy memories of Karl *Marx* and his political enormities!

Yet over a great part of 'the adjacent country of Europe' the name of Karl Barth stands to-day for the most dynamic and arresting message which is being given to our age in the name of Jesus Christ. In Germany and Switzerland, and in the Scandinavian countries, it seems indeed to be almost the only form of the Christian message which is showing real vitality and compelling power; while even in America the lectures of Barth's disciple, Brunner, have met with a remarkably favourable response. Especially among students and younger folk, Barth has found a ready hearing; and in circles such as the Student Christian Movement, where for years past the predominant note has been that of Liberal Protestantism (or in some cases Liberal Catholicism), the more sombre tones of Barthianism have of late begun to be heard.[1]

It is surely then worth while for English Churchmen to make an effort to understand the significance of this 'new message,' of which so shrewd an observer as Count Keyserling has predicted that 'the future of Protestantism (on the Continent) lies with Barth and his group.'

Most of Barth's own writings are still available only in German; but one has been translated into English under the title of *The Word of God and the word of man*[2]; and the lectures

[1] In last year's *Annual Report* of the World's Student Christian Federation, the thought and phraseology alike bear unmistakable signs of Barthian influence; the Editor is an American graduate of Oxford University.

[2] Translated by D. Horton. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1928.)

given by Dr. H. E. Brunner, a distinguished follower of Barth, in America, have been published under the title *The Theology of Crisis*. The two books will give the English reader a fair idea of the main features of Barth's theology.

But the Barthian message is not 'easy to receive' for English readers, to whom both the thought and language are strange and the heavy dogmatism tends to be repellent. Moreover, the Barthian onslaught falls in turn upon every 'school of thought' in English theology. The Modernist has perhaps to bear the heaviest brunt of the attack; for Modernism is, in the eyes of the Barthian, the most dangerous of the heresies which masquerade to-day under the Christian name. And the Modernism which Barth attacks is not only of the 'advanced' kind; he will give no quarter even to the mild forms of Modernism which are to-day accounted quite 'safe' in Anglican circles, and may properly be held even by Bishops under the guise of 'the assured results of modern scholarship.' The *fons et origo heresium*, according to Barth, is the false idea that God is in some sense *immanent* in the world and in man, and the resultant ideas of evolution in Nature, of progress in human history, of the 'Divine spark' in the soul of man, and the authority of religious experience. These all form a *corpus* of false docrine which is fiercely challenged and denounced by the Barthian group:

> 'The idea of the Kingdom of God, and that of Evolution and Progress, are mutually irreconcilable.' (Brunner, *The Theology of Crisis*, p. 85.)
>
> 'Biblical Christianity denies most vehemently any optimistic outlook upon the historical processes as such. History is not the evolution of salvation; it is the evolution of a mankind needing salvation.' (*Op. cit.*, p. 113.)

So far, we seem to be hearing echoes of Dean Inge in some of his more pessimistic moods: but the Barthian goes further:

> 'The thought of *discontinuity* is basic to every primary doctrine of Christianity. . . . The line of separation between God and the world naturally applies to man also. . . . It implies a vehement denial of a divine depth or height in man where communion with God may be effected, or man find salvation.' (Brunner, *op cit.*, p. 12.)
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> 'The Divine is something whole, complete in itself; a kind of new and different "something" in contrast to the world . . . the Wholly Other . . . God.' (Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 277, 288.)

It is not surprising, after this, to find that the Barthian (unlike Dean Inge) is totally unprepared for any alliance with Modernism, and indeed insists that 'Modernism can no longer be called Christianity' (Brunner, *op cit.*, p. 13).

But if our Fundamentalist friends, reading this, shout for joy that their own position is thus vindicated, let them not exult overmuch, for there are arrows destined for them also in the Barthian armoury:

> 'Science has destroyed the doctrine of the infallibility of the Bible.'
>
> 'He who identifies the letters and the words of the Scriptures with the Word of God has never truly understood the Word of God.'
>
> (Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 4, p. 19.)

And if Modernism (according to the Barthian) is 'the dissolution of Christianity,' he is no less emphatic that 'Fundamentalism, and orthodoxy in general, are its petrifaction' (*op. cit.*, p. 13). So the joy of the Fundamentalist reader is short-lived.

But what of the Catholic? Perhaps he, hearing that the Liberal Protestant and the Fundamentalist have alike been trounced by the New Teaching, says: 'Of course. It is as we have always maintained; Catholic Christianity alone stands the test, while other systems and heresies fail!' Well, at least that is not the view of the Barthian. Whatever else he is, he is intensely, almost fanatically, Protestant. To him, Protestantism is the only conceivable type of true Christianity; his watchwords are: 'Back to Calvin!' 'Back to Luther!'; and when he is denouncing modern Protestantism for its apostasy, he can find nothing more scornful to say of it than to ask: 'Is it anything more than a Catholicism tempered by negligible heresies?' (Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 253).

So the three chief 'schools of thought' in Christendom in turn suffer the condemnation of Barth and his disciples. But is Barthianism, then, a mere 'Message of Woe,' containing nothing but criticism and negation? If it were that alone, it would surely not have been hailed by so many as the 'Message of Salvation' to our age. Yet to the outsider it does appear predominantly negative; like the *Advaita* philosophy of Hinduism, it seems to meet our every suggestion with the cry: 'Not so! Not so!' Even in its attitude to Our Lord, it seems anxious to *refuse*

every attempt that has been made to interpret Him in the past than to offer one of its own:

> 'Jesus Christ is *not* the keystone in the arch of our thinking;
> Jesus Christ is *not* a supernatural miracle which we may or may not consider true;
> Jesus Christ is *not* a goal which we may hope to reach;
> Jesus Christ is *not* a figure of history to which we may or may not relate ourselves:
> Jesus Christ is, *least of all,* an object of religious and mystical experience;
> —so far as He is this, He is not Jesus Christ!'
>
> (Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 181.)

And after all this array of denials is set only the abrupt and unexplained affirmation: 'He is God who becomes man, the Creator of all things!' Here, as often, Barth seems as though he would not condescend to explain; he flings out his message with a challenge: 'Take it or leave it!' And probably many English readers will be inclined, without further ado, to leave it, once and for all.

Yet if so, they will not be wise. For Barth is so negative just because he believes that these ways which he rejects lead to nowhere; that they are misleading bye-paths which take men astray from the One Way of Salvation—the Way that Barth believes he has found—or, rather, the Way by which God has found him, and saved him. It is a Way terribly hard to describe; every description only provokes the protest: 'Nay, nay! It is Wholly Other!' Yet it is *real*—intensely real—indeed, the only true Reality, 'breaking through' the world of History, and Nature, and Man. Two things only, it would seem, may be said of it; it is found through the 'Word of God' in the Bible; and it is found through Jesus Christ—nay, it *is* Jesus Christ. And those who have found it are sure that they have passed beyond all relative definitions of truth, all religious experiences in which there is an element of imperfection, and have reached (or have been reached by) God Himself, the Absolute.

To most of us, brought up to be familiar with ideas of evolution, of scientific approximations to truth, of the sense of God all round us 'in divers portions and in divers manners,' of 'relativity' in speech and thought, Barth's is a strange, bewildering message. But the fact remains that when it came to men

crushed by the War, disheartened and hopeless, without faith in Church or Bible or God, it brought to *them*, in many cases, new hope and faith. And the fact also remains that to-day, in prosperous lands such as America, many souls, burdened by the sense of the hollowness of material prosperity and unable to discern any *spiritual* progress behind the ever-growing complexity of life's machinery, these too have found in the message of Barth something which they needed beyond all else.

Moreover, while Barth has criticized mercilessly those who preach the 'Social Gospel' as the essence of Christianity, and maintains that 'the service of man, even when undertaken from motives of purest love, does not thereby become the service of God' (*op. cit.*, p. 276); and while he insists that the need for clear-thinking *theology* is far more urgent than that of 'good living'; yet there is abundant testimony to show that those who have accepted his message have proved themselves second to none in devoted service to their fellows. By their fruits we hail them as *good* men and women; even though they themselves assure us that the motive behind *their* goodness is an essentially different *kind* of love from that which inspires others, who have not accepted their message, to devote themselves to similar service. (Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 79.)

Will Karl Barth's message win a place in English theology? It is hard to say. The English temperament is prone to compromise, and resents the stern, logical *Entweder-Oder* of the German mind. Moreover, most of us hold the faith that God is to be found, truly though not completely, in Nature, in History, and in the heart of man; and this faith has proved itself so precious that we are not prepared hastily to renounce it, even if we cannot logically reconcile it with some other elements in the Christian message. So we are inclined to meet Barth's imperious demand that his message shall be accepted as the Whole Truth with the suggestion that it is perhaps only the natural but exaggerated psychological 'reaction' to the tragic but temporary post-War situation in Central Europe. Barth himself admits that while it comes down through Kirkegaard, Luther, Calvin, from Paul and Jeremiah, it has no contact with Schleiermacher, Martensen, or Erasmus—nor (may we add?) with St. James or

[t. John. So for us it is impossible to accept the message, as its ;asterful prophet demands of us, as the Whole Truth; and we ;ust rest content to be classed by him among 'those outside.'

Yet there are surely elements in Barth's teaching which we hall do well to lay to heart. Is he not right when he says that )-day there is a 'doctrinal vacuum' in most of the Churches, nd that they are trying by feverish energies, in social service or turgical worship, to evade the more onerous task of clear and earless thinking? Do we not need his warning that Reunion Movements which rest mainly upon vague good-will, and ignore r gloss over deep doctrinal differences, are built upon the sand? s it not true that the habit of constant compromise in the game f ecclesiastical statesmanship for expediency's sake is undermining the Church's witness to Truth at all costs? Has he not een truly when he insists that Christ's Message does not run nerely along the lines of what we call 'progress' and 'civilization,' but in some respects challenges the very bases of that ivilization itself? Above all, has he not recalled us to the heart f religion when he insists that a God who is worth knowing and oving—a God who is in any sense a *Saviour*—cannot be merely mmanent in the world, or confined to its workings, but must be a God who has the liberty to 'break in' upon us with the initiative of His Personality? For the God whom Karl Barth worships is indeed a Living God—and a Saviour.

Religion in England to-day seems often to vacillate between complacency, compromise, and pessimism; and few are they who sound a trumpet-note to advance with real conviction. In the message of Barth and his school, complacency is shattered and compromise is blasted with denunciation. Then what is left? Pessimism? At first sight, yes. But behind that pessimism we discern the resurrection of a new faith, and we hear the triumphant note of those who affirm that God has shown them a Way through Death to Life; so that with their founder they can say: 'In our perplexity is our Promise.'

# A LIVING RELIGION *

'He is not the God of the dead but of the living.'—MARK xii, 27.

LEONARDO da Vinci, in his Note Books, makes the remark that the art of painting tends to degenerate if painters get into the habit of imitating one another.

'The painter,' he writes, 'will produce pictures of little merit if he takes the works of others for his standard. This was the case with the painters who came after the Romans, for they continually imitated each other, and from age to age their art steadily declined. After them came Giotto the Florentine, and he, turning straight from Nature to his art began to draw the movements of the goats which he was tending, and thus began to work in such a way that he had not only surpassed the masters of his own time, but all those of many preceding centuries. After him art again declined, because all were imitating paintings already done.'

Thus in art an excessive reverence for tradition, by stifling all stimulus to originality, renders progress impossible. And since nothing can remain stable, where progress is absent decay sets in. This process of decay can only be arrested by a renewal of vitality, and this can only be brought about by a return to Nature, *i.e.* to experience. The artist, instead of copying other men's pictures of goats, must turn to the animals themselves, and draw from the life. A man must paint honestly what he *sees*, though he may use the eyes of his mind to assist his vision.

The same principle applies, not only in art, but also in science. The science of physics, which had been dead for centuries, came to life when Galileo transported cannon balls of various weights to the top of the Leaning Tower at Pisa, and had them all dropped over at the same moment. The theorists assembled at the foot of the tower were confounded by seeing these objects all reach the ground simultaneously. The balls did more destruction upon this occasion than if they had been propelled from the mouths of cannon. They laid in ruins the

* A sermon by the Rev. J. C. HARDWICK, M.A., Durham, B.Sc., Oxon, preached in Great St. Mary's Church on Sunday, May 25th, 1930, before the University of Cambridge.

cientific orthodoxy of the day by refusing to fall at different peeds, as they were required to do by accepted physical theories.

Thus science, like art, derives new life from contact with eality—with experience. Like the giant of legend, it must kiss ne soil if it is to acquire fresh vigour. Giotto turned from copies o flesh and blood, while Galileo turned from theories to experiments; and art and science were renewed. Traditions, *i.e.* econd- or third-hand experience, were abandoned in favour of bservation—*i.e.* first-hand experience.

One is inclined to wonder whether this principle of a return o nature and to first-hand experience may not be capable of xtension to other forms of human activity besides art and cience. If a moribund art or science can be revived by bringing into closer contact with reality, can this treatment be usefully pplied to religion? Assuming, as we are perhaps entitled to do, hat religion is as moribund to-day as painting was before Giotto, nd as physics had become before Galileo and Kepler, can we ecure its revival by bringing it into closer contact with experince and the world of contemporary fact?

It would, I suppose, be admitted that religion, like art and cience, must have a basis in experience, even though that experience may not always be first hand. It is not a mere fabric of ancy built upon nothing. And it would also be admitted that contact with experience is as necessary for the life of religion as t is for life in the corresponding spheres of art and science. Of he God of religion, as of the God of art, and the God of science, t must be true that He is the God not of the dead but of the iving.

But anyone who essays to bring religion back to life by a renewal of contact with experience is faced at the outset with a formidable difficulty. Where is the necessary basis of experience to be found? Giotto had his goats, and Galileo his falling cannon-balls, but is there any corresponding concrete object hat the would-be reviver of religion can get hold of? Where is his raw material? If religion, like science and art, must be renewed by kissing the soil, where is that soil to be found? Does t exist in this sublunary sphere; or are those right who say that here is no such soil anywhere, and that religion is a pathetic llusion? It is certainly not to be found in any material object.

Neither goats nor cannon-balls will help us. We shall have to be satisfied with something less tangible though not, of course, less real. Reality we *must* have.

The search for some solid subject-matter for religion, some world of present fact and experience with which it can establish contact and so find renewal, has been industriously prosecuted in recent years. This search is evidence of a widespread feeling that it is the want of such a basis, and a reliance on past rather than upon present experience, that is the cause of the present weakness in religion. We have been living upon the records of past facts rather than upon facts and experiences which are actually present to us.

The searchers for the necessary solid basis of present fact and experience for religion, have found—or have thought they have found—what they sought in several different directions.

One band of searchers will tell us that we have what we want in occult phenomena, spiritualism, psycho-therapy, and so on. Here in this world of present visible miracle and marvel, we have the present and actual experience which will renew our religious life. Here is something the existence of which cannot be denied, contact with which will bring fresh religious vitality. This is the soil, slightly strange it is true, which religion must kiss.

Another band of equally devoted searchers have found what they seek in an entirely different direction. Following that gifted pioneer, the late Professor William James, they have found their talisman in the phenomena of what is known as 'religious experience.' It is claimed that here at any rate there is something actual and real—not phantom or ghost but the most concrete of all realities, *i.e.* inner personal experience. And in view of their importance as a basis for religion the phenomena of mysticism have been industriously explored, tabulated, and compared. A new science, though not, perhaps, a new religion, has been born. The psychologist, with the detachment of a lepidopterist pinning out moths, studies the raptures and despairs of the different saints, and composes an objective treatise upon them, confident that here religion will find the nourishment it sorely needs.

I should not wish to undervalue either of these two attempts

o supply religion with a basis of actual experience—in short, ith life, and so to assure its revival. Yet I cannot believe that ıe Spiritualist on the one hand, or the Psychologist on the ther, has really found the needed talisman. They seek to estab- sh contact with reality, but the contact which they succeed in stablishing is altogether too partial in extent, and not intimate nough in quality, to be of very much use. Their respective reas of experience are much too restricted.

To take the phychologist, the student of mysticism, first. His work is, from our point of view, rendered less useful by he fact that his interest is confined to abnormal forms of ex- erience, which are not universally shared, as is the case with our ense experience. For one man who has the mystic's vision, here must be thousands who enjoy good eyesight. If the ex- erience of religion is possible only for those gifted with ab- ıormal sensibility, our hopes of bringing religion into contact vith life would appear to be small. No doubt the student of nysticism has done good work in inducing people to believe that hese experiences may shed some light on the nature of reality. But the study of mysticism will not of itself renew the life of eligion.

The spiritualist and supernaturalist are in an even worse osition. The psychic or occult phenomena to which they attach mportance, are to the highest degree abnormal and perhaps argely illusory. And even the orthodox supernaturalist con- entrates attention upon a certain very limited area of experience —the sacraments of his Church; or upon the miracles of past istory. Here lies the weakness of much of our popular religion.

Probably Christian Science, in spite of its fantastic theo- ogy and the eccentricities of its founder, establishes wider and closer contact with present reality than the devotee of the other standpoints, since the facts of health and sickness and the influ- ence of the mind and disposition upon these form a considerable part of human experience. And this would seem to account for he remarkable vitality of this new religion.

It takes as its province a wide area of normal and actual experience. It is what Spengler calls a 'historyless' cult, but a popular religion can afford to dispense with history, since for he majority of people the past does not exist, their interests

centre in what goes on before their eyes. After all, a present miracle is worth any number of past miracles, on the principle that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. A religion which emphasizes the religious importance of miracle, and yet cannot produce miracles on demand in the present, but only talks about them as having happened in the remote past, is entirely powerless to convince the modern world. This is why Catholicism, with its continually repeated miracle of the Mass, and its well exploited miracles at Lourdes, is steadily ousting Protestantism, which has become a mere record of past miracles. We cannot live on the past, nor on the memories left by the past, which grow fainter year by year.

This case of Christian Science is of considerable interest, because it shows the vitality which a cult derives from its ability to point to *present* facts and experiences. Weakness on the intellectual, or theoretical, side seems a negligible handicap, since people do not worry about theories if they can have what they think are facts. If they believe that a religion enables them in health and wealth long to live, they do not study too closely its credentials, especially if their critical faculty is underdeveloped.

I am not suggesting that we should all become Christian Scientists, but only that we should appreciate the causes of the vitality of this remarkably successful cult. Of these the chief will be found to be its contact with a wide range of actual and common experience, and this is a point well worth the attention even of those who, perhaps rightly, regard the cult as one of the superstitions into which an uneducated and emotionally unrestrained public is liable to fall.

It is worth noting that art and science do not make the mistake of limiting themselves to the abnormal or the remote. Both of them alike take as their province the *whole* of present experience. There is nothing in this world, or in any other, that cannot be the subject of a poem or a picture, or the object of scientific research. Can religion be satisfied with a more restricted sphere than science and art respectively? Can it be contented permanently with abnormal and 'supernatural' events, and, above all, with *past* events and extinct conditions? Must it not claim the whole of experience, in the same way as its rivals?

It is true that in the case of religion, we get a paradox. Although the whole range of fact and experience is raw material for religion, as it is for art and science; yet for religion not even the whole world of the actual is sufficient. There is no such thing as a religion of mere fact, however extensive the area of fact may be, for (and this is the essential point) religion *transcends experience*. It cannot be contented with the actual. If it were so contented, it would have ceased to be religion. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews goes to the root of the matter when he says that faith (*i.e.* the religious attitude *par excellence*) reaches out *beyond* experience. He defines it as 'an outreaching of the mind beyond that which it immediately possesses.'[1] In religion, reach exceeds grasp.

Of course, to a less marked extent, both science and art do the same thing: experience is transcended by both, because it is their business to select and interpret their raw material. Science is not a mere catalogue of facts, nor is art mere realism and reproduction. Thus both science and art, no less than religion, transcend experience; they get beyond 'brute' facts: but they cannot *dispense with* experience. If they do, they lose contact with life, and begin to decay. It seems to be the case that art, science, and religion all *begin* with experience, but none of them can possibly *end* there, they carry you beyond it. They take the whole world of experience, and impose upon it their respective interpretations. But apart from experience, all alike are impotent.

The only difference between the interpretation imposed upon experience by religion on the one hand, and the interpretations imposed by art and science on the other hand, is that the interpretation imposed by religion is of a much more radical character. It stands to the world of experience very much as a positive print stands to the negative from which it has been taken. It consists in placing the ideal over against the actual, emphasizes the emphatic contrast between the two, and yet at the same time (as it were by anticipation) it asserts that the ideal is *real* as against the actual. This it does by virtue of 'faith,' which means the capacity to see the ideal as already existing, as already real.

[1] R. G. Collingwood. *Speculum Mentis*, p. 132.

Of course it takes no great penetration to see that this religious interpretation, or transformation, of things can be taken as gratuitous and unwarranted. Likewise, too, can the interpretations of art, and even those of science; you can say that the artist and the scientist are both liars. But just as for science and for art it is a life and death matter to stand by their own interpretations, so it is for religion. The religious point of view consists in the intuitive conviction, that the actual is actually being transformed into the ideal by virtue of a power which if you regard it as working from outside or from inside, you can call God.

But it is fortunately not necessary to give an exhaustive description of what is meant by religious faith. The only point I wish to emphasize is that its province is not this or that abnormal event, but the whole of human experience. And its eyes are fixed on the future rather than on the past.

Religion, then, like art and science, is a means of interpreting the whole of human experience. Hence, by rights, it ought to display the same vitality as human experience itself, and there must be something wrong when it does not. Its present condition proves that somehow it has lost touch with life. It is true that not every part of our experience is equally amenable to a religious interpretation. But the same remark applies in the case of artistic interpretation. Although art takes the whole of existence for its province, there are some things which lend themselves to artistic treatment better than others. Most painters would prefer a sunset to a slag-heap (or until recently would have done so). In science the same principle applies: some things are more amenable than others to exact measurement, and therefore to scientific analysis. My pulse is more easily measured than my thoughts.

But although art and science may display preferences, their theatre of operations is subject to no artificial limitations. There are no arbitrary distinctions which mark off certain areas of experience as being artistic, or scientific, whilst other areas are non-artistic, or non-scientific, though some things may be more beautiful, or more calculable than others. We have nothing either in science or in art corresponding to the arbitrary distinction which we find in religion between the sacred and the secular.

Whatever distinctions may be imported by art or science into their subject matter, are not the result of any arbitrary choices such as that whereby we call 'Onward Christian Soldiers' sacred music, whereas *La Marseillaise* is a secular song—or that whereby we call Aquinas a saint and Spinoza a philosopher. Such distinctions are arbitrary and artificial and disseminate an atmosphere of unreality everywhere. Things do vary in 'holiness' as they vary in beauty and amenability to scientific treatment—but it is the business of religion to take everything as its province, promising or unpromising, as art and science do.

I suggest, then, that when we are looking for an experiential basis for religion, a basis of *fact*, we ought not to fly to the abnormal, nor confine ourselves principally to past events—however sacred—nor should we concentrate upon peculiar emotional states—edifying and enlightening as these may be.

If we sidetrack religion in this way, we shall deprive it of all possible chance of renewed vitality.

There is no such specific experience as 'religious experience'; nor ought we to talk of it any more than we talk of 'artistic experience' or 'scientific experience.'

Religion is a particular interpretation of the *whole* of experience—present and actual—and only by taking this whole world of actual life as its province, and by interpreting it in the light of faith, can religion regain and preserve vitality.

One can only speak in generalities, but the present religious inanition seems to be due to an undue segregation from life such as would be fatal to art or science.

Religion restricts its subject matter in two ways which reenforce one another:

(1) It concerns itself too exclusively with the abnormal—marvels, miracles, revelations. The consequence is that religion becomes starved of contact with life—just as science or art would be, if cut off from a wealth of common experience. It becomes 'precious.' Moreover, these things are no more *religious* than common things.

(2) Religion concerns itself too exclusively with past experience. The problem of how an historical religion is to avoid being absorbed by the past is no doubt a very difficult one—

we do not want a 'historyless' cult, for the tradition which we cherish is immeasurably rich, and to cut ourselves off from it would no doubt be to court spiritual starvation.

Yet perhaps we are unduly afraid of losing what is past unless our eyes are incessantly fixed upon it. After all, we do well to remember that the past, whether we wish it or are aware of it or no, lives *in* us. It is not so easily lost. We cannot altogether lose our traditions any more than we can lose our ancestry.

It is often difficult for historically educated people, for whom the past lives quite as vividly as the present (and perhaps more vividly), to realize how remote and unreal the events and movements of the past appear to, let us say, an artizan in a Northern manufacturing town, though he may be a man not without moral and religious feeling, and with all his normal share of intelligence. To him the twentieth century is a good deal more real than the first, Manchester more real than Nazareth. Thus religion, exclusively concerned with events which are remote in time, place and quality from those of his own experience, seems unreal to him—far less real than science, and even less real than art. These interpret what he sees and knows.

Somehow or other, if religion is to live again, it must take as its province the whole of contemporary life—imposing upon it its own characteristic interpretation—just as science and art are doing now.

How this is to be done is not for me to say. This is a task for that most rare of human products—religious genius. Whether the new outlook will be achieved inside the Church or outside, will depend on conditions which no one can predict. One thing seems to be certain—that if religion is to survive, the change is bound to come. Perhaps the rising generation, which thinks and acts so freely, will be able to help us. They can always encourage themselves with the reflection that God—*i.e.* the creative power which continually makes all things new—is on their side—and 'If God is for us—who can be against us?' Is there not a sort of inevitability which works in things, leaving the dead to bury their dead, and challenging those who are alive to be continuously creative?

# ADVENT TEACHING IN THE GOSPELS

By Hedley F. D. Sparks, B.A., Senior Hulme Scholar of Brasenose College, Oxford.

IN 1892 Johannes Weiss startled the world of theology by his *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, the object of which was to expose the fallacies of Liberal Protestantism and to explain the message of Jesus by presenting it against a background of the Jewish apocalyptic Messianic expectation of the first century of our era. This method, which Weiss had applied only to the teaching of Jesus, Albert Schweitzer, in his *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, some twelve years later, set out to apply to the life of our Lord as a whole.

Stated briefly, the eschatological theory is this: that the ministry of Jesus originated from, and was dominated by, an overmastering belief in the imminent end of this present age, to be heralded by signs in the realms of nature and tribulation among men: that he felt himself to be the Messiah described in the Jewish apocalypses, the heavenly Son of Man of the *Book of Enoch*, who would soon be revealed, coming on the clouds of heaven, to inaugurate a kingdom, catastrophic in character, and sit with his disciples on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. In such terms as these is to be understood the core of the Gospel message, 'The Kingdom of God is at hand.'

In this paper I shall attempt to test the validity of the Weiss-Schweitzer hypothesis, to discover how far Jesus made these apocalyptic doctrines his own, and to consider of what value, if any, is the outlook of Jesus to the Christian of the twentieth century.

## I.

(*a*) In Hebrew 'Messiah' signifies 'anointed,' consecrated, designated by Divine appointment to any status or mission: it is *not* confined by meaning or usage to any particular person or office. The King,[1] the High Priest,[2] Cyrus,[3] the prophets,[4]

[1] *Judg.* ix, 8, 15. *I. Sam.* ix, 16; x, 1; xvi, 13. *I. Kgs.* i, 39. *II Kgs.* ix, 1—5, etc. The actual title is given to the King. *I. Sam.* ii, 10; xxiv, 6, 10; xxvi, 9.

[2] *Ex.* xxix. *Lev.* viii, 12. The title 'the Anointed Priest' appears *Lev.* iv, 3, 5, 16.

[3] *Is.* xlv, 1.

[4] *Ps.* cv, 15.

even the whole nation of Israel,[5] are referred to as the Lord's Anointed. But the term has special connection with the ruler of the future age of blessedness, who is variously conceived as a king, a Branch of the house of David,[6], the Son of David,[7] a human, warring champion who will take away the reproach from his people,[8] or the supernatural Son of Man.[9] A study of the many prerogatives assigned to the Messiah in Apocalyptic and Rabbinic literature will inevitably prove that the term 'Messiah' by itself has no single application: we must therefore beware of grouping together the various and often widely divergent forms which at different periods and in different types of Jewish literature the hope for the future assumed, and labelling them all Messianic.[10]

But Schweitzer, convinced that Jesus was conscious of Messiahship, at once jumps to the conclusion that there was only one form of Messianic hope: he is obsessed by the thought that Messiah means the heavenly Son of Man of Enoch, yet he blandly states that 'there is no question of dissociating the Davidic sonship from the Messiahship,' thus combining two Messianic theories essentially incompatible. Any conception of an Anointed One who is neither Son of Man nor Son of David is *ex hypothesi* excluded, for these two titles are the *sine quibus non* of Schweitzer's Messiah. How far can this assumption be justified?

(*b*) In the Old Testament the expression 'Son of Man' is frequently employed in poetic passages as a periphrasis for 'man' where synthetic parallelism supplies a motive for use:

'What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou visitest him.'[11] The 'one like unto a son of man' in *Dan.* vii, 13 *ff.* symbolises the people of Israel in the ideal age to come; but in the *Book of Enoch*, what was originally symbolical of a people has become transferred to a person: here the Son of Man is a supernatural semi-Divine figure 'named

[5] *Ps.* xxviii, 8.
[6] *Is.* xi, 1. *Jer.* xxiii, 5; xxxiii, 15; *Zech.* iii, 8; vi, 12.
[7] *Ps. Sol.* xvii, 23.
[8] *Targ. Jonathan* to *Is.* lii, 14, 15. *Targ. Jonathan* to *Is.* liii, 2.
[9] *Enoch* xlviii, 10; cp. xlviii, 2; iv *Ezra* xiii.
[10] *cp.* Jackson and Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, i, 1, 362.
[11] *Ps.* viii, 4; cp. *Numb.* xxiii, 19.

fore the Lord of Spirits, chosen and hidden before Him, be-re the world was created and unto eternity.'[12] Son of Man now a title attached to a particular Being and all the original gnificance has become lost. When used in *Ezekiel* it is again title, doubtless indicating the frailty of the prophet's humanity ontrasted with the Divine immutability.

In the Gospels, as Jackson and Lake point out,[13] Son of Man is variously (1) a periphrasis for 'man,' as in the O.T.,[14] 2) a substitute for 'I,'[15] or (3) identical with the figure in *Enoch*.[16] The Gospel use of the term is therefore no more consistent than is the O.T.

But Schweitzer takes it for granted, without any argument, that Jesus *must* have used the title in the sense of the *Book of Enoch*. 'The passages in the Gospels,' he says, 'where the title has not this apocalyptic reference . . . are to be explained as of literary origin': but no proof is forthcoming. A number of Son of Man passages therefore receive no adequate explanation: an exclusive *Enoch* interpretation is too narrow.

Again, if the title be used in the *Enoch* sense at all, such use is entirely inconsistent with Jesus' attitude to the Messiahship, for it is the one certainty of the Synoptics that Jesus, as Schweitzer rightly contends, did not publicly claim to be the Messiah before the trial. He would picture, then, a Jesus, jealously guarding his Messianic secret, who at the same time speaks of himself as the heavenly Son of Man!

(*c*) The actual phrase 'Kingdom of God' or 'Heaven' does not occur in the O.T. or the Apocalypses, but there is running through all a belief that this world age will soon terminate and be followed by the Age to Come, when the sovereignty of God will be realized. It is not until the age of the Rabbis that 'Kingdom of Heaven' is first found: it now seems rather to mean a reign of God in the human heart, a kingdom realisable in societies and among individuals, if only they will receive it.[17]

[12] *Enoch* xlviii, 2ff.
[13] Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.* i, 1, 374ff.
[14] e.g. *Mk.* ii, 27f. *Matt.* xii, 32 (Q.).
[15] e.g. *Matt.* viii, 20 (Q.). *Lk.* xix, 10 (L.).
[16] e.g. *Mk.* xiii, 24ff. *Matt.* xxv, 31, 32 (M.).
[17] e.g. *Seder Rab Amaram* i, 29*b*.

Now the kingdom in the Gospels can bear both meanings, according to context:

> 'Verily, I say unto you: there be some of them that stand here, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the kingdom of God come with power.'[18]
>
> 'The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall men say Lo here! or there! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you.'[19]

It is variously conceived as a future catastrophic event and as an inward spiritual reality in the human heart where the will of God reigns.

Once more Weiss and Schweitzer are lacking: it is true that the latter has explained the parables of the mustard seed, etc., quite unjustifiably, I believe, as illustrative of the future catastrophic kingdom—but that is all. When he says 'the kingdom cannot be earned: what happens is that men are called to it, and show themselves to be called,' has he considered the implication of such a saying as 'Seek ye first the kingdom and His righteousness'?

The eschatologists, then, have not made out their case because they have concentrated on but *one* aspect of Jesus: clearly the Gospels contain two presentations of his life and teaching, one escatological, the other uneschatological, and it is quite possible to make out a good case in favour of either, but no satisfactory solution is to be found in accepting one presentation and ignoring the other: if we accept the eschatological presentation as historically correct, the presence of the uneschatological in the narrative needs explanation, and *vice versa*. It is here the eschatologists fail.

## II.

To the writer there are two, and only two, possible solutions: acceptance or rejection of the eschatological hypothesis must be determined by Synoptic criticism, and the presence satisfactorily explained of those elements in the Gospel narrative which belong to the antithetical position. In what follows I shall argue in favour of the view that Jesus was an original teacher, who had as his aim a thorough reconstruction of society, whose living message became obscured by the intrusion of ex-

[18] *Mk.* ix, 1. cp. *Matt.* viii, 11 (Q.), etc.
[19] *Lk.* xvii, 20, 21 (L.). cp. *Mk.* x, 14, etc.

neous matter derived from the thought of his day, and this r three reasons.

(*a*) It is now generally admitted that the relative order of r documents is Q,[20] *Mark*, *Matthew*. In Q emphasis is rather the conception of the kingdom as already present: in *Mark* chatology is in its transitional stage, while in *Matthew* the ndency to fill in the details and emphasize the apocalyptic de is still more marked. Since the most spiritual view of the ngdom is found in the earliest sources, and the most apocaptic in the latest, the former has *prima facie* the greater claim acceptance as the original conception of Jesus.

(*b*) A consideration of the teaching of the Early Church reals that it was predominantly apocalyptic in character, and in me quarters remained so until quite late. But the presence of on-eschatological material in the earliest literature of an pocalyptic community can only be accounted for by supposing at it owes its origin, not to that community but to some other ource, which must surely be the teaching of Jesus. It is hard believe that such a community would tone down sayings pocalyptic in character and insert passages into the tradition oreign alike to the historical Jesus and their own mode of inking.

(*c*) Amos the prophet came forward with a new message: eremiah was remembered because he set himself against his mes in the interests of something higher: can it be that Jesus erely accepted unquestioning the thought of his own age, that e had no individual contribution to make, He who is undenibly the most influential figure in human history? I can but elieve that the historical Jesus made a breach with the past and truck out in a new direction.

'No man seweth a piece of undressed cloth on an old garment.'
'They put new wine into fresh wine-skins.'

## III.

How, then, is the very strong eschatological element in the Gospels to be accounted for? Mr. Streeter has shown clearly[21]

[20] Q. (German *Quelle*, 'source'), a hypothetical document, consisting nostly of sayings of Jesus, assumed by critics to lie behind the matter common to *Matthew* and *Luke* which is not found in *Mark*.

[21] B. H. Streeter, '*Synoptic criticism and the Eschatological Problem*' n *Ox. Stud. in Syn. Prob.*, p. 423ff.

that there was a steady development in the direction of emphasizing and even of creating sayings of Jesus of a catastrophic, apocalyptic type, and of thrusting more and more into the background sayings of a contrary character. As a simple illustration Mark's

> 'There be some of them that stand here which shall in no wise taste of death till they see *the Kingdom of God come with power*,'[22]

has been changed by Matthew into the more definite

> 'There be some of them that stand here which shall in no wise taste of death till they see *the Son of Man coming in his kingdom*.'[23]

'But what right,' asks Streeter, 'have we to assume that the process had not already begun even before *Q* crystallized the tradition into writing . . . a tendency which continued to modify the records of our Lord's sayings even after they had been reduced to writing cannot but have operated previously when memory was unchecked by the written document.' That much of the eschatology ascribed to Jesus owes its origin to nothing more than the invention of primitive Christianity can be asserted without fear of contradiction. Yet it is Streeter's dictum that 'the argument must not be pushed to the length of entirely eliminating the apocalyptic element from the Gospel teaching of our Lord.' With this judgment I am in entire agreement; to substantiate my own position I must go farther.

In 1919 appeared Dr. Martin Dibelius' *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*, in which the author contended that the Gospel stories are to be studied as units employed in missionary preaching: originally each unit was indepedent, but the evangelists have grouped them into continuous narratives, Mark being the first to do so. But there also existed in the Church collections of sayings, moral codes for the general needs of the earliest Christianity, which eventually found their way into the Gospels—an example may be found in *Q*. The two other exponents of the Form-criticism school, Bultmann[24] and K. L. Schmidt,[25] both follow the same general method. The latter feels the Gospels to be 'writings of the people, by the people and for the people': as the stories grew up about the saints and crystallized into lives, so the stories and sayings of Jesus like-

[22] *Mk.* ix, 1. [23] *Matt.* xvi, 28.
[24] R. K. Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition.*
[25] K. L. Schmidt, *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu.*

se grew and crystallized. But Bultmann is a thorough-going eptic: the Gospels can be explained as a combination of lestinian, Jewish Hellenistic and pure Hellenistic sources—rhaps even *Q* never purported to contain only Jesus' words, t may have been compounded frankly and explicitly of elents of very different origin.

Although himself an eschatologist of the Barthian school, it in Bultmann that I find the key to the solution of the problem. he Form-criticism school has compelled all Gospel critics to cognize that there was in the Early Church a whole mass of ating tradition which was used and incorporated at will. here was no stereotyped life of Jesus, no authorized collection, en of sayings, at first; only a story here and there, a parable aphorism, which passed from mouth to mouth, to be changed the process and eventually disappear, while new stories or yings would find their way in, which, primarily having nothing do with Jesus at all, would soon become part of 'those atters which have been fulfilled among us.'

Now Papias, bishop of Hierapolis, appears to have known a number of 'strange parables and teachings of the Saviour' hich he adduced, according to Eusebius, 'as if they came to im from unwritten tradition.'[26] Among these is his famous escription of the Millenium, which *he* believed to have been escribed by Jesus, but which *we* know, from Irenaeus' preseration of the now lost works of Papias,[27] to be derived from the yriac *Apocalypse of Baruch*.[28] The tendency to confound ewish apocalyptic with the unwritten tradition of the Logia of esus is thus well exemplified (c. 135 A.D.). Have we any reason o suppose that it did not operate from the start?

Colani,[29] as long ago as 1864, directed attention to the *Little Apocalypse* (*Mk.* xiii), pointing out that, as it stood, it presented a highly composite and self-contradictory appearance. He demonstrated conclusively on internal evidence that the hapter contains (1) a discourse dealing with the persecution

[26] Eusebius, *H.E.* iii, xxxix, 11.
[27] *Irenaeus* v, xxxiii.
[28] *Apoc. Bar.* xxix, s.ff.
[29] Colani, *Jésus Christ et les croyances Messianiques de son Temps*, . 201ff.

which will befall the disciples of Christ at the hands of the Jews,[30] and (2) a self-contained apocalypse in three acts.[31] Whether Jewish or Jewish-Christian in origin, this apocalypse is an example of the intrusion of extraneous matter into the Gospel teaching of Jesus.

However there are some apocalyptic sayings in the Gospels which cannot be explained in this way, *e.g.* the verse from the Matthaean charge to the Twelve, 'Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel before the Son of Man be come.'[32] The mission charge itself is demonstrably composite in the last degree, being made up of extracts from (1) Mark's charge to the Twelve,[33] (2) Luke's charge to the Seventy,[34] (3) Mark's *Little Apocalypse* and (4) matter with no parallel elsewhere,[35] under which heading we must group the saying under consideration. But to suggest that because no parallel is provided in another Gospel, Matthew made it up is futile, for no author could put into the mouth of his hero an imaginary saying which he knew was falsified by history. If Jesus predicted that he would come as Son of Man before the disciples returned, subsequent events proved him mistaken. The verse, therefore, bears the hall-mark of originality—but the originality of whom?

In this connection I would put forward the hypothesis that the eschatological sayings of Jesus which bear the stamp of originality are, so far from being his, the authentic words of John the Baptist.

Josephus writes of the activity of John and tells how finally Herod, fearful lest his preaching and influence should provoke a rising, cast him into prison.[36] With this the Gospels agree: John preached repentance in view of the coming judgment; he was, in short, a perfervid disciple of the apocalyptic school in Judaism, and there is no evidence for any other conclusion. But he is equally clearly the founder of a sect: the earliest disciples of Jesus had been disciples of John[37]: the disciples of

[30] *Mk.* xiii, 3—6, 9—13, 21—23, 28—29, 32—33.
[31] *Mk.* xiii, 7—8, 14—20, 24—27. Appendix, 30—31.
[32] *Mt.* x, 23.
[33] *Mk.* vi, 6—13.
[34] *Lk.* x, 1—16.
[35] *Matt.* x, 5—8, 23.
[36] *Josephus. Ant.* xviii, v, 2.
[37] *Jn.* i, 37.

n are contrasted with those of Jesus[38]: they are sent to Jesus a question,[39] they take up the corpse of their master lay it in a tomb[40]: they are referred to by the Twelve.[41] In- d John had even ordained for his disciples special fasts[38] and n them a special form of prayer.[41]

About 50, Apollos came to Ephesus, presumably from Alex- ria, 'knowing only the Baptism of John'[42]: later still, Paul nd 'certain disciples' at Ephesus, who were baptized but o John's baptism.'[43] This demonstrates how profoundly n's influence was felt in districts as remote as pro-consular a, and perhaps Egypt, after the lapse of a quarter of a tury. The significant fact is, that the disciples of John were ated very closely to the Christians. Apollos and the 'certain ciples' were *all* received into the Christian Church, and what pened at Ephesus we may presume to have happened else- ere. Now it would be very extraordinary if the members of h a movement had preserved no sayings and traditions of ir master, such as the Christians had of Jesus. A supposition this nature is, however, precluded by the Gospels, which con- n an account of John's preaching. My suggestion is, there- e, that as John's disciples became incorporated into the ristian community they brought with them John's teaching, ich soon became confused with that of Jesus. An analysis of *Q* passage *Matt.* iii, 7-10, *Lk.* iii, 7-9, creates a probability t Matthew has used his material for John and Jesus inter- angeably: others may have done the same.

Is it not possible, then, that those seemingly original apoca- tic sayings of Jesus go back to the Baptist? May it not be n who told the multitudes that flocked to hear him that many uld 'not taste of death before they saw the Kingdom of d come with power'? May not John have sent out his dis- les on a missionary tour of Judaea, assuring them that they uld 'not have gone through the cities of Israel before the n of Man be come'?

[38] *Mk.* ii, 18.
[39] *Matt.* xi, 2.
[40] *Mk.* vi, 29.
[41] *Lk.* xi, 1.
[42] *Acts* xviii, 24ff.
[43] *Acts* xix, 1—7.

## IV.

Having now given what would seem an adequate explanation of the origin of the eschatology wrongly attributed to Jesus, I am faced with the final question: if Jesus uttered no apocalyptic teaching, how is the thorough-going apocalypticism of the Early Church to be accounted for?

It was the view of Volkmar[44] that the historical Jesus founded a community without advancing any claim to Messiahship: but 'it was as a Messianic claimant,' says Rawlinson, 'that Jesus was condemned by the Jews and put to death by the Romans, a fact which involves that He must have Himself claimed to be the Messiah in his lifetime.'[45] That he was conscious of Messiahship, therefore, cannot be doubted, *but it was not a Messiahship of the Son of Man or Son of David type*: the temptation narratives, whatever be their historical worth, are decisive against such an interpretation. Jesus goes back to the O.T.: in the synagogue[46] he takes as the text of a sermon *Is.* lxi, 1, 'The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the poor.' He was Messiah in the original sense, 'anointed' or consecrated by God to the greatest mission the world has ever known, and of this he was profoundly conscious. But when he proceeded to develop his text 'they were all filled with wrath in the synagogue and rose and cast him out of the city.' The open proclamation of his office was impracticable: to the public 'all things are done in parables.'

That 'Son of Man' meant for Jesus the supernatural figure of *Enoch* has already been shown to be untenable. He was, furthermore, at least as familiar with the O.T. as with *Enoch* (that he never quotes or alludes to the Apocalypses is, in this connection, most significant): his usage, then, I believe, goes back to *Ps.* viii, to *Ezekiel* and *Daniel.* Ezekiel the prophet was the mouthpiece of God with the title Son of Man: so was Jesus. The Danielic Son of Man was the actualization of the ideal Israel: so was Jesus. The Psalmist had spoken of 'man' and the 'son of man' made 'lower than the angels,' only to be

[44] G. Volkmar, *Jesus Nazarenus und die erste christliche Zeit.*

[45] A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ,* p. 11.

[46] *Lk.* iv, 16ff.

wned with glory and worship. Jesus breathed in this atmosere and saw in it the ideal image under which to represent mission.

It was to the sowing of an inward, spiritual kingdom—a new nception—to the establishment of the rule of God in the heart man, a rule 'which cometh not with observation,' that he voted his life. But the people turned a deaf ear: they did t understand: this novel teaching, 'who could hear it?' To e Twelve also, throughout his ministry, Jesus was a commandg but enigmatic figure[47]: they realised that he was conscious Messiahship, that he called himself the Son of Man, that he eached the Kingdom, but they did not understand.[48] Like 'eiss and Schweitzer, they came to interpret his Messiahship, s use of the title Son of Man, his proclamation of the Kingom against the narrow background of the Jewish apocalyptic ith. After the Resurrection they felt that he was alive, but is event was only to be interpreted as the vindication of their ıtlook. Whereas previously they had wavered in doubt, unle to explain their Master in any other terms than those of ocalyptic phantasy, from the first Easter Day onwards they ere convinced that they were right and that they would soon e the Son of Man with power and great glory coming on the ouds of heaven.[49] Howbeit they were not altogether unmindıl, in their enthusiasm for his immediate return, of much that esus had said: a few short sayings and some parables, easily emembered, and revealing the true nature of their Master's aching, remained unviolated: the Figure still shines mysteriusly through.

It is this Figure which the Fourth Gospel depicts, the Messiah sent and anointed to proclaim the knowledge of God, hereby man may have eternal life. The Jews ask 'Who is *this* on of Man' spoken of by Jesus? He is the Son of God, now s Son of Man, under earthly limitation, that being lifted up to eaven He may draw all men unto Himself[50]: His Kingdom is ıward and spiritual, 'a kingdom not of this world.'[51] Yet it is

[47] e.g. *Mk.* iv, 41; x, 32. cp. Dibelius, *Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Religion im Christentum.*

[48] e.g. *Mk.* iv, 13; vi, 51f; viii, 21.

[49] *Acts* i, 11; iii, 20, etc. [50] *Jn.* xii, 34ff. [51] *Jn.* xviii, 36.

still the same lonely Figure: not even in this Gospel do the disciples yet understand.[52]

The coming Advent is resolved into an event already present[53]: the Judgment is present and subjective, and the unbelieving world stands self-condemned, for man is justified or condemned, *not at some future date*, but according to the attitude which he assumes towards the light which, with Jesus, has come into the world.[54] But the acceptance of the light brings participation in the Kingdom, and in eternal life, an ethical and timeless conception.[55] The Resurrection is not to be delayed until the 'last day,' but 'the hour cometh and now is': 'he that heareth my word and believeth Him that sent me hath eternal life and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life.'[56] The life of the soul is therefore absolutely and completely independent of the body—'he that believeth in me though he die, yet shall he live'[57]: such life is the knowledge of God and of Jesus,[58] and it was with the purpose of increasing this knowledge that the Gospel of John was written.[59]

## V.

That this presentation is in complete harmony with modern theories of the universe will be at once apparent. The man who believes that the physical world order has come into existence at a particular point in time, in a given way, will inevitably also believe that that existence will terminate in a similar manner. If the origin be catastrophic, the end will also be catastrophic: if the one be evolutionary, the other will be a process of slow and gradual extinction. Jesus shows points of contact with every age, 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever': it was the historical Jesus who planted his new message in the primitive Christian garden, as a grain of mustard-seed, far less than all the seeds of apocalyptic theory, which, watered by the indwelling Christ, grew of itself in secret, and has put forth great branches, so that mankind of all ages can lodge under the shadow thereof.

[52] *Jn.* xiv, 7, 8. [53] Jn. xiv, 18, 19. [54] *Jn.* iii, 19; ix, 39.
[55] *Jn.* iii, 3. [56] *Jn.* v, 24, 25. [57] *Jn.* xi, 25.
[58] *Jn.* xvii, 3. [59] *Jn.* xx, 31.

The eschatological doctrines of the Jewish apocalypses, with all their attendant crudities, must go for good: it must be frankly recognized that all hopes of a Second Advent of Our Lord in the future have been based on a mistaken interpretation of his message: the Resurrection, if we retain the term at all, must be conceived, not as a resurrection of the body at some future date, for 'a knowledge of elementary chemistry negatives such a fancy'[60]: the Risen Life is to be enjoyed here and now by that communion with Jesus and knowledge of him whereby we enter the Kingdom of God. 'That Kingdom is the eternal spiritual world, the realm of those ends for which God has planned the cosmic process. Consciousness in man has acquired a new nature in becoming spiritual: in Christian language it has been transformed in putting on Christ. By virtue of the Christ-Spirit it has become a fact of the ultimate real world; because that world is eternal we shall find in it our immortality.'[61]

## THE BIRMINGHAM REBELS

By the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

IT is well known that a few clergy in the Diocese of Birmingham have persistently refused to obey the Bishop's direction that there shall be no services, such as 'Devotions,' in connection with the reserved elements of Holy Communion. Two of them have now published what purports to be a faithful record of important events in the dispute.* They wish their readers 'to form an accurate estimate of the importance and rights of the controversy.' This is very necessary, whether or no the readers' natural sympathies be largely with the Bishop. Everyone knows of Dr. Barnes' reiterated condemnation of extravagances of sacramental doctrine, and his great plainness of speech. This knowledge, unless combined with accurate information, sometimes

[60] E. W. Barnes, Essay, *'Science and Immortality.' Immortality*, p. 169.
[61] E. W. Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

* *So-called Rebels. A Record of Recent Events in the Diocese of Birmingham.* By G. D. Rosenthal and F. G. Belton. A. R. Mowbray and Co., Ltd. Price, 2/6.

lends colour to repeated suggestions that the Bishop, on account of his personal disagreement with opinions legitimate in the Church of England, is harassing a band of devoted clergy; the word 'persecution' is applied to his administration; and the idea is sedulously encouraged that he rules his Diocese as a tyrant, and inconsistently with his professed liberal principles. This propaganda occasionally alienates from the Bishop the support which is his due. Mr. Rosenthal and Canon Belton have at least done service in making a connected written statement; and not least to the Bishop, for whatever may be thought of his utterances, to the open-minded reader this record will justify his administration. That the book may fully serve this end, it is necessary to criticise some misrepresentations and lapses from factual precision.

(1) The writers record that the Bishop was invited to attend a service of thanksgiving for 'the Catholic Revival in Birmingham.' In declining the invitation Dr. Barnes said that the Anglo-Catholic movement did not avoid with complete success 'erroneous teaching tending to superstition.' To illustrate his meaning, he quoted from the Bishop of Gloucester's Visitation Charge[1] as follows:

> 'The doctrine of the Apostolic Succession is taught in a mechanical way. Grace is said to have come down from the Apostles by the golden channel of the laying on of hands. And it is implied that, except in that way, the gift of the Holy Spirit is not given . . . We are told that the priest has the power of making the body and blood of Christ. Now all language like this is most harmful. It is bad theology. It suggests a mechanical idea of Sacrament and divine grace. It puts stumbling-blocks in the way of many people. It is saying what the majority of people can't believe, and won't believe, and ought not to believe.'

A reply to the Bishop was drawn up with the assistance of an Emergency Committee of the E.C.U. The writers suggested 'with much regret' that Dr. Barnes had misrepresented Dr. Headlam's words. In the above quotation, they say, the row of dots stands for the words, 'We have similar uneducated language among English Roman Catholics, as for example when we are told' etc. They claim that the omitted words 'give a meaning to the words which you quote entirely different from that which

[1] *The Church of England*, p. 67.

ou assign to them.' Now, first, the row of dots marks the omission of no less than eight lines, and secondly, it is quite plain at Dr. Headlam *did* mean that the language criticized was not unknown in the English Church; for at the beginning of the noted paragraph, he says about the revival of respect for Sacraments in the Church of England: 'The less satisfactory theology of the Mediaeval Church *or the Modern Roman Church*[2] is copied, and some rather unintelligent language of our own is introduced.' It is clearly ridiculous to suggest that Dr. Barnes falsified the quotation or gave to it an 'entirely different' meaning. This charge properly applies to those who made it.

In the same reply a matter 'of greater importance' is complained of. Dr. Barnes had written, 'Some in your movement have introduced the practice of Reservation, for purposes other than communicating the sick,' and added that 'it is ordered by the rules of our Church that those elements should be at once consumed after the Communion Service.' It is asserted that herein Dr. Barnes wrongly claimed the authority of the Bishop of Gloucester: the basis of the assertion is a passage from Dr. Headlam's *The Church of England*[3] in which he expresses his readiness to consider on its merits any application for perpetual Reservation in the parish church. Now it cannot be too clearly stated that *at this time* Dr. Barnes was not demanding the cessation of Reservation: he was merely claiming his right to regulate the manner of such Reservation, and forbidding 'Devotions.' He was absolutely justified in claiming Dr. Headlam's authority; for on the previous page of *The Church of England* to that quoted by the Anglo-Catholics, Dr. Headlam writes:

> 'There is, I think, no doubt either as to the teaching or the intention of the Church of England. The Church of England not only lays down a definite rule as to the way in which sick persons are to be communicated, but also commands the consumption of all that remains in the Communion Service . . . The object was to prevent reservation as inconsistent with the purposes and intention of the Sacrament.'

He added that he thought some modification of the rule was now required; but he also said that in granting permission for any reservation, he did 'not allow any extra-liturgical adoration of our Lord as present in the Sacrament,' or any service in connection therewith. The assertion that Dr. Barnes illegitimately

[2] Italics mine.

[3] See pp. 102 *f.*

used the authority of Dr. Headlam is an amazing piece of effrontery. Even though Dr. Barnes says that the *actual* demand for reservation is based on 'erroneous doctrine,' it does not follow that he thinks *all* reservation must necessarily and always be rooted in error. This incident shows both the need for the most careful scrutiny of everything which the writers of this book assert, and the mentality with which Dr. Barnes has to deal.

(2) The next matter is more unpleasant. We are told that this controversy is unique in that there have been no opportunities of personal contact with the Bishop. It appears that, with one exception, one of the authors has only 'met the Bishop from time to time officially at meetings of the Cathedral Chapter,' and that 'the other has never met him at all.' The truth is that in their social relations, the Bishop and Mrs. Barnes have made no distinction between the so-called rebels and the other clergy. Mr. Rosenthal has from the first been regularly invited to garden parties where he could have had personal conversation with his Bishop: he has never attended and has usually ignored the invitations. Twice a year, on the occasions of the Chapter meetings which he has attended, Canon Belton has also been invited to Holy Communion and to breakfast afterwards: these invitations he has never accepted. Such facts accord ill with the unctious language in which, in this book, these men express their longing for happier relations with their Bishop, and to end the controversy. Moreover, Canon Belton was long ago informed by the Diocesan Secretary that the Bishop would meet any of the Anglo-Catholic clergy, provided that none claimed to see him as the leader of a group. The Bishop is easily accessible to his clergy, and no request for an interview from a clergyman or churchwarden is refused. On this aspect of the controversy, the only appropriate comment must be suppressed.

(3) In October, 1925, the Churchwardens of St. Mark's, Washwood Heath, sent a letter to the Bishop[4] in which they said that the extra liturgical services in use in their church had been

[4] As indicative of the teaching to which they were accustomed, they say 'that our Church teaches that "the whole service is the sacrament, and Christ is present there inasmuch as he is present wherever two or three are gathered together in his name" is complete news to us.'

nctioned by the former bishop, Dr. Wakefield. Dr. Barnes plied that he thought they were in error. The two authors of is book, with another, replied that it was the Bishop who was istaken, and that the service had been sanctioned under condi-ons which had been loyally obeyed. Dr. Barnes thereupon asked r the memorandum in which the conditions were laid down. he priests demanded to know for what purpose he required it! e answered that he could not, in diocesan administration, take ognizance of a document of which he did not know the contents; e also expressed surprise that, though the controversy about Devotions' had been going on for some time, his predecessor's ermission of the service had not previously been mentioned to im. The priests' reply was that no memorandum was ever sued; their relations with Dr. Wakefield moved on so high a lane of intimate trust that none was necessary. The Bishop ext asked to see copies of the service of 'Devotions,' whereon anon Belton asked for an interview. The Bishop, while in-mating his willingness to see any of his clergy, said he thought ie reply to his request had better be in writing. At this point, ie conclusion of Mr. Rosenthal and Canon Belton is scarcely redible, but here it is: 'Our efforts at a better understanding etween the Bishop and ourselves were thus frustrated.' They efused to send the form of service, and declined 'firmly and nally' to send any further communications unless the Bishop uaranteed that such would not be published.

Why this extraordinary step at the crucial moment? What ossible reason could there be for refusing to send Dr. Barnes opies of a service which had been sanctioned by Dr. Wakefield? t is fair to remark that it is not the custom among honest men o render verification of their statements impossible. Moreover here is conflict between their statements and one issued by Dr. Wakefield,[6] in which he assumes responsibility for 'permitting rayers in the part of the Church where the Reserved Sacrament vas placed,' but says plainly that 'no actual form of Devo-ions was ever officially approved in my Diocese.' Unfortu-ately there have been instances in which Bishops who have hown friendliness to Anglo-Catholicism have found their sup-

[6] This statement of Dr. Wakefield is quoted much earlier in the book nd out of relation to the events which are its natural context.

port claimed for more than they intended. There was nothing unreasonable in Dr. Barnes' wish to keep to writing. Examination of dates in this book shows that there had recently been disagreement between the Bishop and the Anglo-Catholic patron of St. Mark's as to what was said at an interview. And it is an extraordinary claim that the order of worship in church, a matter affecting all who may enter to worship, should be decided between the Bishop and a small group of his clergy *under a seal of privacy*. That the claim should be made, and its refusal regarded as outrageous, reveals the pass to which the Anglo-Catholicism of certain Birmingham clergy had come.

(4) A month later some Anglo-Catholic incumbents decided to withhold subscriptions from the Diocesan Board of Finance. This also is represented as a step taken with regret but forced upon them by the Bishop's intolerance. The truth is that before the break occurred, there was discussion between the Diocesan Secretary and some Anglo-Catholics in hope of finding an agreed policy to lay before the Bishop. It failed solely because of the refusal to abandon 'Devotions.' The Bishop had declined to license curates to churches where this illegal service was held, but the Anglo-Catholic withdrawal took place before any money grants had been refused by the Bishop of Birmingham's Fund. No grant, either then or since, has been refused: no applications have been made. The step was taken solely because the Bishop insisted on what was absolutely lawful alike under the existing Prayer Book and those of 1927 and 1928.

The reasons given for refusing the Bishop's lawful direction are disingenuous. There is the familiar argument that, under the oath of canonical obedience, a Bishop has no right to enjoin discontinuance of practices sanctioned by the supposed unrepealed Canon Law. That this Law justifies 'Devotions' is an absurd contention; even the claim that Reservation is thus lawful is repudiated by such a learned Anglo-Catholic historian as Dr. Kidd. Moreover, the obedience promised to a Bishop is true obedience, as well as canonical, and 'in all things lawful and honest.' This oath cannot be isolated and interpreted out of its relation to other solemn vows. Every clergyman, when made a Deacon, professed his trust that he was duly called 'according

. *to the due order of this Realm*, to the Ministry of the urch,' and on ordination to the Priesthood each has promised to minister the doctrine and sacraments . . . *as this Church d Realm hath received the same*.' Now there is no doubt that e revised Prayer Book was twice rejected by Parliament mainly cause it attempted to legalize Reservation. It is quite legitiate to hold that the position is intolerable and that it must be anged: it is not possible to hold that Reservation is not egal. Nor is it common-sense to suppose that the Church, ice over, sought the sanction of the State for a practice which d always been strictly legal. Further, in the Prayer Books of 27 and 1928, 'Devotions' was most emphatically ruled out: eservation was to be solely for the communion of the sick and or no other purpose whatever.' This was the only administrave order insisted on by Dr. Barnes throughout the three years which the Birmingham dispute developed: it was to this that edience was refused. It was not until *after* the rejection of e Revised Book that he announced that in churches where eservation is now made, he should require it to cease before stituting a new incumbent.[7]

It may be thought that this stricter requirement is unwise: that not the point. The principle is that Dr. Barnes is asking nothing or which he has not the authority of the law and of the House f Bishops, even though some of them may act upon a laxer iew. In the Prayer Book of 1928, no general right of Reseration was conceded: the Bishop's permission was necessary, nd he was to be satisfied as to its need. And in the Upper louse of Convocation on July 10th, 1929, it was resolved by a najority,

> 'that the Bishops, in the exercise of their legal and administrative discretion, will be guided by the proposals set forth in the Book of 1928, and will endeavour to secure that the practices which are consistent neither with the Book of 1662 nor with the Book of 1928 shall cease.'

It is, as the Archbishop of Canterbury made clear, for the individual Bishop to decide how far he may think it right to follow

[7] The writers acknowledge this in a chapter headed 'Later Stages of the Controversy,' and elsewhere they say their action was misunderstood because 'in the first instance' the Bishop did not forbid Reservation altogether (p. 63). But only the careful reader will recognise that this was so for the three years in which the controversy was fully developed.

the guidance of these proposals. Mr. Rosenthal and Canon Belton say:

> 'It is the solemn duty of a Catholic to obey constitutional authority in the Church, even when that authority is hostile to him, and when its judgments seem to him unwise, and perhaps unjust.'

Where then is the least evidence that, in administration, Dr. Barnes is guilty of 'an arbitrary and unconstitutional authority'? They say:

> 'We cannot possibly recognize the right of an individual Bishop to exercise autocratic powers, and, setting himself against the whole body of the Catholic Episcopate throughout the world, to enunciate a different law for his own diocese.'

In what way has the Bishop of Birmingham attempted any such thing? The plea that the Bishop ought to continue everything that his predecessor allowed is futile: if every extra-legal direction of every individual Bishop were to become 'a statute for ever' we should have a welter of individualism that would shame the stoutest Protestant. The plea is a frank demand for chaos. If the unfounded charges made against their Bishop are to be regarded as due to honest misunderstanding, it can only be by a considerable use of the plea of 'invincible ignorance.'

These writers also justify their action as a protest against the Bishop's utterances. It is said that he scornfully attacks doctrine legitimate in the Church of England. Be it so; but it is quite irrelevant to the question of obedience to his *lawful* directions. The teaching office of a Bishop is distinct from his administrative office. He may not take *repressive action against opinions* tolerated in the Church, and Dr. Barnes has not done so; but it is not only his right but his duty to speak his mind. Otherwise the Bishop becomes, as Dr. Barnes has put it, 'a mere register of well-established opinions.' If Anglo-Catholics may justifiably disobey lawful directions because of their Bishop's sacramental opinions, may an Evangelical, conceiving his Bishop to teach superstitious doctrine about sacraments, either decline to celebrate them or to entrust their administration to a layman? Or may a Modernist, disapproving of a Bishop's conservative attitude to Biblical criticism, cease to read the Scriptures in church? The whole 'argument' of these Birmingham priests is a complete desertion of all Catholic principles in the interests of their individual preferences for Roman practices. 'Nay, but thou shalt

re it me now : and if not, I will take it by force.' As was done Shiloh, so do they. They complain that their parochial work armed. The reply is that if their sacramental teaching is in the limits allowed by the Church of England, it can be quately taught without 'Devotions,' and Reservation is not ential to it; if it be otherwise, their teaching merits Dr. nes' criticisms. So much has been said of the offensiveness those criticisms, that it may be worth while to quote from the mon published in *The Church Times* of November 28 :

> 'The Blood of the Immaculate Son of God runs in our veins now. The Divine element has entered our lives through the Sacraments of Divine Grace.'

ch language is just as offensive to thousands of Churchpeople id is much more harmful) as is any word of Dr. Barnes; it ords his justification. Indeed, even the columns of *The urch Times* bear frequent witness to the uneasiness caused to ny Anglo-Catholics by the mentality of which the book of . Rosenthal and Canon Belton is an example. It encourages e idea that the standard of straight dealing within is lower an exists outside the Church. Until it is converted, Anglo-tholicism will never make its full contribution to truth and to e life of the Church.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## AN INEFFECTUAL SAINT

'An ineffectual saint.' So does Andrew Lang describe the subject of shop Knox's biographical study.* 'A pietistic Erastian' Foxcroft calls n in his preface to the *Robert Burnet Papers*. That he was a saint no ader of Bishop Knox's book can doubt. That he was ineffectual is true so far as he failed to solve problems which, at any rate under the con-ions of his time, were insoluble. Bishop Knox describes his Erastianism 'a readiness to submit to civil government as having the authority of d at least by permission, and to render obedience to it, in order that the ul might concentrate its attention upon spiritual life.' Such an attitude is not congenial to an age in which the claims of Church and State con-onted one another in uncompromising antagonism. 'Whatever,' Bishop nox adds, 'interfered with that life he shunned and denounced. Whether were the quarrels of Churches fighting for their rights, or constraining nsciences and enforcing strict doctrinal or political terms of communion or any other form of worldly action cloaking itself in religious garb, it y outside the Christian's concern.' Leighton's 'pietistic Erastianism' d the Covenanting Minister of Newbattle to accept under Cromwell the

* *Robert Leighton, Archbishop of Glasgow.* By Bishop Knox. (Published by James arke & Co. Price 12/6.)

Principalship of Edinburgh University and under Charles II to become in succession Bishop of Dunblane and Archbishop of Glasgow. The last chapter of his public life before his retirement from the see of Glasgow was an ineffectual attempt to heal the quarrels of the conflicting Churches by combining what was best in Presbyterianism and Episcopacy. The problems which baffled Leighton are still with us and are still unsolved, and one of the virtues of Bishop Knox's book is the clarity with which he presents their fundamental elements. The problem of the relationship between Church and State, for example, has recently been raised in Malta in its most acute form. In essence, Bishop Knox considers, the theocratic claims of Rome and Geneva are identical.

> 'It might be an exaggeration,' he says, 'but it would not be wholly a historical misrepresentation to say that Calvin was the great reformer of the Papal Church. It is certainly the case that both Tyndale in England and Luther in Germany called upon the State in virtue of its Divine authority to reform the Church according to the Word of God. Calvin presented to the world the idea of a pure Church reforming the State. Between him and Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, there were strong affinities, but especially in their exultation of the spiritual over the temporal power. Both regarded the visible Church as a world-wide society according to the Divine idea, even if that ideal was not realised in fact. But to the realisation of that ideal every earthly interest must be sacrificed.'

Leighton's attempt to graft Episcopacy into Presbyterianism is worthy of careful study to-day in view of the Lambeth move towards Reunion. Bishop Knox considers that he failed because Episcopacy and Presbyterianism as conceived by their respective adherents were in principle incompatible. Presbyterianism rested on the belief in the *direct* rule of God, and the seat of spiritual authority therefore was in the congregation. 'Ideally, we may say, there are no laity in the Church of Scotland.' A rigid theory of Episcopacy implies that in certain vital matters, such as the Sacraments, the rule of God is *mediate*.

> 'The truth is that rigid and strict Episcopacy is a form of Church government which implies the existence of an order marked off, both from laity and from the clergy, by exclusive possession of powers, wherein it has been *confirmed* by Divine Providence, if not actually gifted with them by Divine institution. . . . Where this order exists, however much it may be hedged about into such qualifying adjectives as the "historic" episcopate, or associated with forms of democratic government, its supposed sacred character, and the independence of each bishop in his diocese in the exercise of the offices attaching to that character do in practice, if not in theory, militate against, or even nullify, the unmediated and *direct* rule of Christ in His Church. In a strictly episcopal Church Christ rules mediately through the episcopate. When Leighton tried to graft Presbyterianism on to Episcopacy he was attempting a task impossible under the theory of Episcopacy accepted by the most correct Episcopalians.'

It was his sense of duty which drove Leighton along the arduous road whose end was failure. 'He could not,' says Bishop Knox, 'conscientiously or without scruples raised by self-love disobey the commands of either Cromwell or Charles II. In the anarchy of the Rebellion he chose the path of obedience, and again chose it at the Restoration, well aware of the cost at which he made the surrender.' The cost was to live in an atmosphere

ecclesiastical passion with which he had scant sympathy and for which had perhaps too little understanding. In a letter he speaks of 'our unworthy and trifling contentions, of which I have little other esteem than a *Querelle d'Alman*, or a drunken scuffle in the dark, and do pity exceedingly to see a poor Church doing its utmost to destroy both itself and religion by curious zeals and endless debates about the empty name and shadow of indifference.' In truth his spiritual home was with the Cambridge Platonists for whom he had a deep affection. He also loved the mysticism of Thomas à Kempis, and was in sympathy with the 'devout humanism' of S. Francis de Sales. As an ecclesiastical politician he failed, but he left behind him a memory and influence of a life instinct with love, humility and forbearance. 'When Leighton is out of fashion,' says Bishop Knox, 'the spirit of Christ is out of fashion, and the body without the spirit is dead.'

G.L.H.H.

## TOLLE, LEGE.

We have received for review the first twelve pamphlets of the *What we Believe Series*, edited by the Rev. R. G. Griffith for the Modern Churchmen's Union. The titles of the pamphlets and the names of their authors are as follows:—

*God.* Rev. A. E. N. Simms, M.A., B.D.
*Creation.* Rev. Harry Bailey, M.A.
*Evil.* Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.
*Providence.* Rev. A. H. Streeten, M.A., M.C.
*The Gospels.* Rev. R. G. Griffith, M.A.
*Jesus Christ.* Rev. T. J. Wood, M.A.
*Immortality.* Rev. R. G. Griffith, M.A.
*The Atonement.* Rev. T. F. Royds, B.D.
*The Church.* Rev. E. P. Boys-Smith, M.A.
*The Religious Values of Modernism.* Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A.
*Reunion.* Rev. W. W. Longford, D.D.
*The Core of Christianity.* Rev. H. D. A. Major, D.D., F.S.A.

The aim of these pamphlets is to provide positive statements of belief in simple language. Though mainly intended for the laity, they may be usefully read by the clergy. Each pamphlet might well suggest the theme for a sermon on modern lines. We desire to commend them.

H.D.A.M.

## RELIGION AND SCIENCE.†

Considering its size, Mr. Cross's *Religion and the Reign of Science* is an exhaustive book. It is also very well written, and betrays not only wide reading but powers of original thought. Mr. Cross tackles his subject from the various standpoints of physics, biology, psychology, Biblical criticism and philosophy. The chapter on physics contains a very interesting discussion, adapted to lay comprehension, of the bearing of the new quantum theories upon the problem of free-will, and the author takes the view that it is possible to combine the causal law with the possibility of freedom. One notes his remark that the views of Whitehead, Eddington and Jeans (*i.e.* their religio-philosophical views) 'are highly individual, and have received little assent from the learned world.'

* Sold at the Office of the Modern Churchmen's Union, Church House, Westminster, S.W.1. (Price 1d. each; 1/- per dozen, post free.)

† *Religion and the Reign of Science.* By F. L. Cross, M.A., B.Sc. (Longmans, 1930. 7/-; 2/6 paper covers.)

In the psychological sphere, Mr. Cross holds that as the nature of individuality becomes better understood, scepticism as to the existence of the soul will diminish. He thinks that psychical research has indicated that 'we know very much less of the relations between spirit and matter than used to be supposed,' but holds that it has proved no more than this.

There are some sound remarks on inspiration in the chapter on Biblical criticism. Mr. Cross declares that ultimately the test of inspiration 'is not dissimilar to that which we use to determine the inspiration of any masterpiece. We believe a piece of poetry or music inspired when it "finds" us, and no external criterion will ever convince us to the contrary if it does not.' While agreeing heartily with this view, one wonders how far Mr. Cross has accepted its implications. Is Mr. George Moore's *The Return of the Essenes* an instance of inspiration? And if not, why not?

There are some useful remarks on Christology in the philosophy chapter. Mr. Cross identifies himself with the views of Apollinarius, a heretic who is at last coming into his own. He held the dangerous, if reasonable, view that 'human nature . . . was in a sense coeternal with the Logos, not something adventitious, but something essentially "consubstantial and connatural."' 'Along such lines as this, the Christological problem needs to be envisaged,' adds Mr. Cross. We quite agree, and congratulate our author on having eluded the snares of Barthian and Ottoesque mystagogy. We look forward eagerly to Mr. Cross's next effort.

J. C. HARDWICK.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## ALFRED FAWKES.

We are glad to publish the following appreciation of Alfred Fawkes:—

### I.

Every friend of Alfred Fawkes must feel his loss in his or her own special way; for me he will remain ever connected with the most sacred portion of my past life. I remember him as my own friend; but not less vividly, as the friend of George Tyrrell. How well I remember them, at Richmond (Yorks) and at Honington, sallying forth together on their interminable walks. From different points they arrived at their meeting-place, and an umbrella or stick would be waved from each other as they came in view of each other.

Their problem was never quite the same, and their solution was even more different. As soon as ever Fawkes found himself up against the opposition of authority he packed his effects, and left the place where he was not wanted for the place where he was welcome. The Catholic Church, I suppose, never meant to him what it did to Tyrrell; though both were converts their motives and ideals had been profoundly different; Fawkes easily refound his place in the Church which he had quitted. His Modernism was not that of Tyrrell; Catholic and Anglican Modernism can never be quite the same. A French friend remarked to me yesterday that we had in Fawkes, Loisy and Tyrrell three typical attitudes in the case of ecclesiastical condemnation. Fawkes said: 'I am not wanted, I will go.' Loisy said: 'I will go when I am put out.' Tyrrell said: 'You cannot put me out, I stay.'

The difference between the conduct of Fawkes and that of Tyrrell was ...nded on different conceptions of Church authority. More and more ...wkes showed, by an increasing Erasbianism, that however truly the ...ritual elements of Church life escapes all external control, its adminis...tive force depends on its organized authority. In the Church of Rome, ...it authority is not in any way subordinate to State control, hence its ...ion, in his view, is final. In the Church of England that authority is, in ...tain essentials, subordinate to the State; hence equally, for him, the ...itimate ecclesiastical ordinances of the State were final. He was ...ocked at anything which he regarded as clerical indiscipline, *e.g.* in ...ses of divorce and re-marriage; and we all know his views in regard to ...e revised Prayer Book.

'You *are* an Erasbian,' I sometimes said to him; and he always replied ...heerfully, 'Yes, I am.'

Tyrrell had a more democratic conception of every form of authority, ...nce his persistence, in the face of condemnation, was logically justifiable, ... well as spiritually compatible with his religious philosophy.

Being myself of the latter school, Fawkes and I never ignored those ...sic differences which were compatible with so much sympathy in other ...spects, and he loved to tell me that I was really, at heart, a Protestant.

How grievously I shall miss him! No year passed without our meeting ...least once, and no year passed without my finding a welcome at the ...tle vicarage with him and his niece. And then long chats between the ...ree of us, round the library fire or in the garden; while the interruptions ... the dog were never resented; he had as much right to his say as any of us.

Alfred Fawkes when once a friend was always a friend; he had the ...ft of friendship. And his critical faculty never impeded his appreciation ... all that was genuine in religion and piety. I think he kept most of his ...atholic friends, even those who regretted his secession. For who could ...oubt of his sincerity, or believe that he was inspired by any motives than ...ose of rectitude and sincerity?

M. D. Petre.

(the Roman Catholic biographer of Fr. George Tyrrell).

II.

*Je suis persuadé qu'il a toujours été à sa manière, qu'il a voulu être, un ...erviteur de la vérité.*

Professor Alfred Loisy.

III.

From one who knew him very intimately for many years:—

'I have not a single memory of him that is not one of unfailing good...ess, and kindness, and unselfishness. One very striking quality was the ...omplete absence of resentment when treated with ingratitude and un...indness. He was quick to resent an injury to a friend, but was himself ...he most forgiving of men. I do not think he forgave personal slights and ...wrongs as "a Christian duty," but because, being what he was, he could ...ot have done otherwise. His kindness to the young, his great love of ...nimals, and his loyalty to old friends and old ties, were all evidences of ...an unusually true and warm heart.'

*From Miss C. L. Maynard, M.A. (Moral Sciences Tripos, Cambridge), First Principal of Westfield College, London University.*

SIR,

In the year 1900 I paid a visit to the Holy Land as a member of a 'Cook's Tour,' and there I first met Mr. Fawkes.

Being in the middle of very arduous labours, my need was for rest and refreshment, but, alas, for the most part my fellow-travellers were so uncongenial that there was little of this to be found. Most of them were amazingly ignorant and some few positively flippant, making jokes and singing 'Coon Songs' on the Lake of Galilee. Amid this noisy crew, there shone out one man as a gentleman, a scholar, and a Christian, and this was Mr. Fawkes.

Our acquaintance began almost by single sentences, but it grew steadily until we became real friends. We had been together some ten days when, chancing to sit next to him in the tent at supper, I said: 'May I ask you something? Are you in any way connected with Guy Fawkes?' He replied at once in his peculiar hurried voice, 'I have that honour. He is a collateral ancestor in my family,' and then, turning full on me with his engaging smile, he added, 'Not but that the whole story from beginning to end is a fabrication of you Protestants.'

Thus it went on. When with the party he was all that is most gently still and reverent, but whenever we chanced to be alone together, he took the opportunity to say something startling or amusing. We were a full week riding slowly northward from Jerusalem to Damascus, and I became very tired of the rough roads and the somewhat futile talk of the dragoman about Ahab and Jezebel, and on the last day, when Mr. Fawkes was kindly helping me to catch and mount my horse, I said: 'I am getting weary of this. For one thing, we have left the Old Testament and are going into the *Arabian Nights*!' Handing me the bridle, he said: 'And the two books are very much akin, are they not?' 'Oh, Mr. Fawkes, what a dreadful thing to say!' I exclaimed, and, looking up, he replied in well-feigned alarm: 'Have I said anything in the least degree unorthodox? I only meant that both books are thoroughly Oriental in character.'

Our contact was not all thus. We had at times deep and serious talk, and when we parted we entered on a correspondence which never slackened. Only two or three times in the year, but it was well worth while. I read his articles (signed 'Romanus') in the *North British Review*, and I had two days alone with him in 1909, when he left the Church of Rome. Twice I have stayed with him at Ashby St. Ledgers, and once he came for a few days to my little Sundial. All the range of our discourse, our sympathies, and our lack of adjustment here and there, all these things are far too long to enter upon, but the whole of it remains with me as an incident that stands by itself, as an interesting and indeed a beautiful memory.

## A CRITICISM OF 'INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY.'

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*.

SIR,

I have read Dr. Macnicol's article on 'India and the Future of Christianity' with the greatest enjoyment. His appreciation of Hinduism shows that the best missionary thought has travelled far beyond the position that was taken in the early days when the Hindu was simply regarded as a

benighted ignorant heathen worshipper of idols. At the same time, el some hesitation in accepting the general conclusion to which the er seems to come that Hinduism cannot create, or recreate, an atmos-e of moral energy in which free men may dwell 'unless it is transplanted n a Hindu, to what we may describe as a Christian, soil'; and, though ve had no philosophic or theological training, and so dare not criticise Macnicol's appreciations of the Vedantic and Advaitic Schools of Hindu ught, I feel bound to give such expression as I may to my doubts.

If I have understood the message of the Jerusalem Missionary Confer-e aright, it was this, that the enemy of Christianity is not Hinduism lslam but Irreligion or Secularism, and that in the battle against that my Hindus and Moslems are not even merely neutrals, but allies. One of course a perfect right, even a duty, to criticise one's allies. I also rtily agree that all religions are not equally true. To me all organised gions, as a result of human incapacity at any time to grasp and express whole, seem to emphasize aspects rather than the full body, and also, s, to contain various elements of falsehood. Indeed I often think the nel of the Modernist position lies in a recognition of this fact, and its ential message is the demand for continual restatements of religious th in fuller, wider, truer terms.

I do not wish to quarrel with Dr. Macnicol's argument that the monis-(or pantheistic—is there any real diffierence between them?) thought t permeates Hindu philosophy logically leads, when taken alone, to alism and the loss of all moral distinctions. What appears to me to be testing puzzle of *all* explanations of the Universe is to give a due ce to the unity and omnipotence and omniscience of God without robbing n of his dignity as a free agent. But has Christianity really solved the oblem? I am told that the doctrine of the Trinity was framed to meet s very difficulty. I have the greatest respect for the Athanasian creed, haps because it is quite beyond the range of my comprehension, but to man in the pew—and, I suspect, to many a scholar in the study too—as in fact no meaning except in terms of tritheism. Roman Catholicism tects its flock from the full glare of an ineffable deity by adding even fourth person to the godhead in the Virgin Mary and a whole host of ser and limited personalities in the Saints and the hierarchy of Pope d Priesthood. You have here in fact the counterpart of the popular poly-eism of Hinduism—sops for babies, deemed incapable of digesting the ong raw meat of Truth.

Have the Reformed Churches by the emphasis they place on the Person Jesus finally resolved all difficulties? The simple believer, unversed in eological learning but anxious for a satisfactory explanation of his ligious life, still treads a precarious path along the knife-edge between lief in Jesus as God, leading to a Jesuolatry that in fact obscures, or at ast pushes into the background, all thought about the absolute God, and lief in Jesus as Man, which easily becomes indistinguishable from a culiarly barren form of Unitarianism.

I repeat that I am no theologian, but from the little knowledge I have the tendencies of modern thought I venture to think that Christianity is coming to many of us less a belief *in* or *about* Jesus and more an effort recover the religion *of* Jesus. The question we seek to solve is not, imarily, Who was Jesus, but what did Jesus think and teach about God. an his creed be summed up in the two words, 'Our Father'? Possibly ot, but it seems to me at least the heart of it, and, if so, pregnant with

ideas explosively destructive of much popular and orthodox theology. Were this the place to pursue this idea, I should seek, for instance, to show how meaningless in the light of Jesus' 'Our Father' becomes the claim for him of uniqueness so beloved by theologians which separates him from our common humanity. Here I am only concerned to urge the importance of the positive deduction from Jesus' Religion, that we are *all* Sons of God.

This claim of kinship with God may not on the philisophical plane be a completely logical solution of the governing enigma of the religious life, which, I repeat, is the reconciliation of Absolute Deity with individual human freedom and responsibility, but emotionally at least it provides immense satisfaction. In Christ we are free.

It is this central idea which to me seems so sadly lacking in the attempts hitherto made at expressing the essential truth of the Christian Message, and I look forward to restatements by twentieth century theologians of Jesus' Faith which shall give it its due proportion.

Theoretically, it seems to me continued in the Hindu Thinker's conclusion, 'I am He'—a proposition imprudent in its daring assumption, but, if true, sublime and fulfilling.

With this idea, then, I believe that Hinduism contains within itself the elements for that 'moral energy in which free men may dwell,' and that there is no more need for Hinduism to be transplanted into a Christian soil, than there is for Christianity to be transplanted into a Hindu soil.

Two paths leading to the same goal, two reachings out towards the same truth, two efforts to solve the same problem of life; I do not visualise either absorbing the other, but each learning from the other and so making more perfect its own understanding and expression of the Highest.

ARTHUR DAVIES.

## THE FIRST APPROACH TO JESUS.

SIR,

My article on 'Christian Teaching for Young Children' in your November number has produced many letters and, while I have replied to each individually, may I make a few comments that may be of general interest?

Several correspondents have asked for the name of the Unitarian's book to which I referred. It is *The Story of Jesus,* by Mary Francis (Lindsay Press, 5 Essex Street, W.C.2.).

As the result of this correspondence I have come across the short, simple and well-illustrated booklets, *The Holy Child, The Wonderful Stories of Jesus,* all of Mrs. George Chitty, of Eton College (Religious Tract Society). I should like to pay them a sincere compliment and to plead with both authors and publishers to give us more of the same kind. They certainly are the most helpful books that I have seen and are really suited to children of three to six.

Most of the correspondents have given me names of books for children of nine to twelve or fifteen. There is no lack of them, and many that I have seen are excellent. But my article was concerned with the first approach, and here Mrs. Chitty stands alone. I have been reading the Rev. Morgan Jones' *New Testament in Modern Education,* a book full of sound Modernist opinions. But the author takes the view that the conventional 'Wonder Stories' are adequate for beginners. I cannot be convinced by this view. Of course, there is no difficulty in getting children of four to

y and accept stories about special stars directing shepherds, streams ght coming from the sky to shine specially upon Jesus, Our Lord ing on the waters, and so on. The point is that the best approach is m the known to the unknown. The first foundations need to be of con-e—a basis of fact.

One correspondent writes that I am a Unitarian, presumably assuming my account of a child's first needs was my belief about the full measure child's religious education. May I explain that in urging an early con-ration upon the human life of Jesus I do not for a moment urge that full Gospels shall not be taught later? When our children are old gh to discriminate, and to understand how the New Testament came e written, nothing shall be concealed from them. On the contrary, they l have as much teaching and reading as they can absorb.

Another correspondent writes that I am not a Christian. With such cism argument is useless. It makes me wonder whether the Reforma-was worth while. Such Protestant Fundamentalism with its infallible le seems to me far less attractive than Roman Catholicism with its llible Church.

However, with these two exceptions all the correspondents agreed with main theme of my article, and so let us hope that before long some e books will appear that can be of use to very young children.

CLAUD MULLINS.

## CHRISTIAN TEACHING FOR YOUNG CHILDREN.

The article entitled 'Christian Teaching for Young Children,' by Mr. ud Mullins, which appeared in your last issue, deserves especial con-eration. His experience in the matter he describes is by no means un-mon.

In a parish with a very large Sunday School it is necessary to obtain umber of fairly expressive books about the life of Jesus, from which sons or stories can be drawn for the purpose of instructing the children. seems, however, well-nigh impossible to secure books at all suitable. e ones offered for sale too often contain presentations of Jesus which hardly be expected to attract an average lad aged about twelve, and every case too much space is occupied by accounts of miracles. The glo-Catholic and the Evangelical do not suffer this misfortune: they no ubt find books which please them. But the Modernist, who desires to e boys and girls a view of Christianity which shall be in harmony with rest of their education and with their experience of life, is in a difficult sition. Either he must compose properly graded courses of lessons for his teachers, a method hardly practicable; or else he must place in their nds books about which he has grave misgivings.

However, some readers of the *Modern Churchman* may have had a re fortunate experience and, perhaps, have come across books which e really sound and valuable. If so, would they kindly write and make ention of them?

REGINALD G. JACKSON.

St. Andrew's, Church House,
Borderley, Birmingham.
*November 25th*, 1930.

## SERMONS BY MODERN CHURCHMEN.

SIR,

I should be glad if you would kindly allow me to call the attention of your readers to a special course of addresses by members of the Modern Churchmen's Union, which will be given, by kind permission of the Rector, the Rev. and Hon. James Adderley, at St. Edmund, King and Martyr, Lombard Street, as follows:—

January 7th. *Modern Irreligion.* Rev. A. E. N. Simms, B.D.
,, 14th. *The Church.* The Very Rev. the Dean of St. Paul's, K.C.V.O.
,, 21st. *What is Modernism?* Rev. H. D. A. Major, D.D.
,, 28th. *Miracles.* Rev. Harold Anson, M.A.
February 4th. *Christ for To-day.* Rev. R. D. Richardson, M.A.

The addresses will be given at 1.10 p.m.

T. J. WOOD
(*Organizing Secretary*).

*November 28th*, 1930.

## PENNY PAMPHLETS.

SIR,

When six out of the doxen penny pamphlets ('What We Believe' Series) are being reprinted it is opportune to ask the support of all your readers for the series. It was issued with the intention of trying to make liberal religious principles more widely known and understood. The following suggestions are put forward in the hope that members of the Modern Churchmen's Union will lend their individual support to the best of their opportunities.

(1) *Church Times, Guardian* and *Church of England Newspaper* alike suggest that the pamphlets would be useful in study circles.

(2) When attractively and openly displayed in church bookstalls the booklets sell readily; we have sold 400 in Farnborough, a country church.

(3) Our friends are often glad to see that the Church is trying to re-express its ideas. Here is a sample: 'I shall have to go through them more than once to get all I can out of them; there is such a lot condensed into a small compass.'

(4) Local papers and booksellers are often willing to notice and to stock the series, when approached personally.

(5) Perhaps most important of all is it to observe that, if Modernists merely buy a set for themselves, we shall have laboured in vain. We want members to back up our efforts by buying a set or two *to give away to those who are not Modernists.* We all know religious folk who are puzzled or put off by the traditional interpretation of Christianity. Those who belong to other schools of thought are often strangely interested to learn our point of view. There has seldom, if ever, been a greater chance of Modernism contributing its share to the common life of the Church.

(6) Perhaps it is worth observing that if every member of the Union bought two sets to give away, we should more than sell out another edition and so make the pamphlets pay for themselves, thus saving the Union's funds for further publications.

R. G. GRIFFITH.

Farnborough Rectory, Kent.
*November 3rd*, 1930.